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Is Russia re-defining tactical warfare in Ukraine?

Published : Saturday, 12 March, 2022 at 12:00 AM  Count : 1005
Shahriar Feroze

Shahriar Feroze

Why is Russia taking so long to completely occupy Ukraine is the number one question I have to face from all walks of life?

A simple and straight answer from this writer is that he does not know. I am neither a defence analyst nor a military strategist. Only the Russians know what they are doing in Ukraine, but this much I can confirm for sure that definition of tactical warfare is changing in correspondence with technological advancement and frequent changes in battle plan.

On one hand both factors have become key determinants responding to the ground reality of the battle, while on the other both factors are also impacting  the applications of the main four closely related battlefield functions  - firepower, mobility, security, and shock action.

However, thanks to the all pervading smokescreen that has erupted in the wake of the Ukraine War - prompting this writer to go through a bit of military history and knowledge.

Among the hundreds of video footages captured of stagnated Russian military convoy columns, isolated scenes of close combat or blowing up of tanks or helicopters, we actually have little understanding of the reality what's happening in the front.  

Whereas the Western media agencies have indulged in circulating the notion of how Putin's war machine is being repelled in Ukraine - the Russian and pro - Russian media agencies have been markedly cautious and nuanced about Russian advancements and victories.

Whereas Western defence analysts have described absence of Russian air force with a sharp tone of rebuke, how had the Russians respond?

They remained silent.

The point here is simple: Given a clear understanding of your enemy's strengths and weaknesses, if you can win the war by not engaging the navy and air force, why should you engage them? And if you have a clear understanding on threat perceptions you also know when to fight, retreat or delay to seal victory.

A reliable data with statistics posted on 8 March confirms that less than half of Russian losses claimed by Ukraine have been verified. At the same open-source information, largely coming from social media posts can also be used to compare who is gaining the upper hand on the battlefield.

The Ukraine-War-smokescreen, as I call it, gets even more mysterious in the midst of conflicting and also biased media coverage.

The point, however, as much as it is a true military war, it is also a war of media deception. And this prejudice is born out of the fact that why most people are posting images of destroyed Russian military hardware - and not the Ukrainians.

As one may assume, the ongoing media coverage is shaping the global audience in favour of Ukraine - at least this writer believes it is also aiding and influencing Russian military strategists altering and introducing newer tactics in the battlefield.

Blocked Russian military convoys stretching for miles may give a clear hint of strong Ukrainian resistance taking place, but it can also imply swift and small military actions clearing up all pockets of resistance in the rear. And it may also indicate to counter-deceive the media perception by showcasing a deliberate delay.

What's important here for Mr. Putin is to win the war, whether faster or slowly is up to his tactical experts. Moreover, while anything may happen in a war he has been markedly refrained from forecasting a time period of complete victory.

At this juncture it is important to draw some comparisons.

The latest war in Ukraine is different to the first and second Chechen wars, and it took over a decade for Moscow to seal a deal to rule over Chechnya. By 2009, Russia had severely disabled the Chechen separatist movements and large-scale military confrontations ceased to exist till this day. Back then Mr. Putin had surely played a shrewd but an astute game by mixing war with diplomacy.

While dealing with Georgia the Russian strategy had been noticeably different in 2006. The country had launched a full-scale diplomatic and economic war against Georgia, and the Russians had won.

It is almost impossible to draw a conclusion for any tactician or strategist to draw a conclusion at this point of the war. But no matter what we assume as mere spectators from thousands of miles away from Ukraine and Russia, the war over Ukraine is  very well premeditated and a calculated one. It was not launched in haste.

Given Ukraine's sensitive geographical location, shared borders with buffer states connecting to central Europe and security threats for Russia, the invasion was inevitable. But then again military superiority does not guarantee in winning wars in the 21st century - within or beyond the borders.

Wasn't USA far much militarily superior to Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, or wasn't the former Soviet Union more superior to Afghanistan?

Both USA and former USSR's military adventurisms had ended in utter failures. Moreover, wars in this millennium are won over commanding superiority over multiple factors.

Previously it was widely believed when you capture the capital city, the war had been won. As facts suggest, Kabul was under US and pro - US occupation forces for two decades plus, but who had ultimately won the Afghan war?

Let's imagine this scenario: Kiev has been won over by the Russian war machine anytime soon, but the invaders somehow fails to seal the porous Ukrainian borders from infiltrating of Western military aid. And in that case guerrilla warfare in Ukraine would only intensify. By now Western ammos are reportedly being amassed on the other sides of the Ukrainian border.

Which option should be prioritised - capturing the capital city or sealing the borders first?

What is more important - inviting the risk of a prolonged guerrilla war by capturing Kiev or fast deplete the enemy's existing military strength?

A personal remark, in Ukraine the Russians are focused on a sustainable victory than to a quick victory.

Open-source intelligence may offer us a window into what's happening on the ground based on limited information and widely biased interpretation, but it is clearly dim-witted to believe Putin's army not to have considered these factors beforehand.  

However, misuse and misleading circulation of drone or satellite photos and digital images is not a new phenomenon in today's war theatres, but they are actually impacting the dynamics of tactical warfare today. And I find the Russians to be markedly observant and cautious dealing with the issue.

To finish with, tactical strategies also matters in losing or winning a war. Whereas Mr. Putin's soldiers have mastered the art of winning wars, there is no reason to deny that the relatively weaker Ukrainian army is incompetent.

There is a conventional saying, beat the enemy with your skills, but unlike in the past wars, military skills and their applications in tactical warfare is rapidly changing based on the battle's ground reality.

We will know more on whether the Russians applied a sledge-hammering tactic or a Russian-roulette tactic in Ukraine, once the war is over.
The writer is assistant editor, The Daily Observer






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