Tuesday | 14 January 2025 | Reg No- 06
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Tuesday | 14 January 2025 | Epaper
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Neighbours covet a stable Rakhaine

Published : Tuesday, 14 January, 2025 at 12:00 AM  Count : 276
The Rakhaine State bears varied strategic importance to Bangladesh, regional and the global powers. With the long standing conflict, the Arakan Army (AA) has taken full control of the 271 km Border with Bangladesh, controling 14 of the 17 townships in Rakhaine. Left to capture are Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Men Aung.

The AA as of 24 December 2024 is alleged to be controlling 8 out of 11 Chinese projects in Rakhaine State. China has huge investments and strategic stakes in Myanmar, vis-à-vis, Rakhaine. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is intended to provide China easier access to the Bay of Bengal (BoB) by connecting Kunming in Yunnan province to the small port town Kyaukphyu in Rakhaine througha land route and Gas-Oil pipeline. It allows China to bypass chokepoints like the Six Degree Channel (between the Indian Great Nicobar Islands and the Sumatra Islands of Indonesia)and the Strait of Malacca dominated by the Indian, US and allied regional Navies and pirates and thus evade its"Malacca Dilemma", a perceived vulnerability to its energy and trade lifeline.

The Rakhine Coast, further allows China access to the Indian Ocean and the BoB facilitating trade and military relations with Pakistan and Middle East. Along with its base in Djibouti, its potential future footprint in Gwadar of Pakistan, and the Listening Posts (coupled with a potential air base in the Great Cocos Island in southern Myanmar) its Rakhaine foothold also provides China the ability to dominate the sea routes from the African East Coast-Gulf of Eden-Persian Gulf region towards the Asian Far East through the Indian Ocean. The Chinese are known to have reached a deal with the AA on the Kyaukphyu Port. By 08 Jnuary 2025, the AA took control of the China-Myanmar oil/ gas pipeline station in Ann Township, Rakhine State, leaving Kyaukphyu as the only section of the pipeline still outside its control.

Meanwhile, China is rumoured to establish joint security company with the Junta Government and already employed around 500 associated "Private Security Company (PMC)" personnel to safeguard its interests in Rakhaine State. However, the presence of such potentially armed Chinese PMC personnel in Myanmar may attract troubled attentions from the AA, India and USA and result in unconceivable, yet, significant related responses, further complicating the already complex regional security dynamics.

India is also known to be negotiating with the AA to continue its Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) Project. For India, KMTTP is the alternative to the Siliguri Corridor through SittwePort of Rakhaineconnecting the isolated "Seven Sisters" provinces of northeastern India with Indian Mainland. The Indo-Myanmareseborder serves as a conduit for smuggling weapons into Northeast India, particularly Manipur, contributing to the region's security challenges. TheSittwePort and the KMTTPin Myanmar are thus of paramount importance to India.With a Rakhainefoothold, India will also be able to connect its Seven Sisters, control the aforementioned cross-border weapons smuggling, andinterfere with the Chinese investments and Road-Oil-Gas connectivity from Rakhaine to China.

The USA would possibly like to viewthe Rakhaine State through its own strategic lensesconforming to the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), less dominated by regional heavyweights and denying a resurgent Russia a warm water bastion in the BoBin Rakhaine. US's tailored responses would mostly be craftedevadingany special inclinations contradicting core US interests.

Developments in Rakhaine concerns Bangladesh. Though the pro-democracy National Unity Government (NUG) has recognized the Rohingyas as Burmese citizens, the AA's claimed acceptability of Rohingyas(notwithstanding their alleged anti-Rohingya atrocities in Rakhaine) is questionable at best, unless proven otherwise.It further created scope for the Junta to recruit the Rohingyas to fight beside them (despite the Junta itself being responsible of torturing and uprooting the Rohingyas) against the AA with a possible deceitful assurance to grant them citizenship. The permanent repatriation of the million plus (and ever increasing FDMN - Forcibly Displaced Rohingya Nationals) from Bangladeshremains growingly uncertain.The AA, despite being a Non-State Actor (NSA), has allegedly expressed its inclination towards governance, negotiations and displayed a vision of an inclusive Rakhine integrating both Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim population, including the Rohingya. Despite such expressed desires requiring solid practical reflections, scopes may be explored for a gradual permanent settlement of the FDMNs from Bangladesh with due scrutiny.

Bangladesh has additional concerns. The AA and other EAOs possessMan-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), Sniper Rifles, other small arms andcommercial drones customized for military operations. Their potential proliferations across Bangladesh border and beyond may haveunfathomable internaldisturbingeffects, once available to the domestic anti-law elements, vested groups and extremists. More so, the numerous weapons/ ammunition factories in Magwe and Bago Regions once fall to the AA, will leave an over confident AA to immaturely flex muscle and further fuel Bangladesh's domestic disturbances. A potential future AA capture of Junta naval vessels will render the Naf River and the estuary vulnerable for the unarmed Bangladeshi fishermen and locals frequenting the waterways.

AA is alleged to have refused a ministerial offer from the National Unity Government (NUG), due to a prevalent bilateral bitterness. Elements of Su Kyii'sNational League for Democracy (NLD) remain within NUG. The NLD oncedisavowed the Arakan National Party (ANP) to elect a state chief minister in Rakhine, despite the ANP winningsignificant seats in state elections.The AA also detained three NLD candidates in Rakhine state in 2020, corresponding to NLD's arrest of AA's anti-war activistsand at some point blamed the NLD for supporting the Burmese "Facist Army" and "collaborating and covering up war crimes."Recently, the AAreiterated their political objective to be achieving confederacy through struggle, rather than negotiations,significantly differing with the NUG's vision for a federal democratic union. The AA also notified the NUG to limit its meddling in certain aspectsregardingRakhine State.

The United League of Arakan(ULA - AA's political wing) occasionally speaks mimicking an independent government. It once described its fight for "the freedom of the people of Arakan and achieving the liberation of all the ethnic groups within the region" and the "Arakan People's Revolutionary Government welcomes and recognises all foreign investments that will bring development to the Arakan region and assist in its development and progress" a sweet chimefor both Chinese and Indian investments in the region.Rakhine is apparently nearing an unprecedented catastrophe due to a blend of interlinked issues. International and domestic restrictions on goods entering Rakhine cause severe lack of income, hyperinflation, and worryingly reduced domestic food production. Essential services and a social safety net are virtually non-existent, leaving an already hapless populace at risk of collapse in the near future. With such state of affairs, coupled with varying present domestic and international catalysts, the AA may at some point opt for independence over integration into a larger federal political structure.

It may be remembered with indispensible forethoughtthat despite the Indian KMTTP running through the Rakhaine State and the Chin State before entering Mizoram of India,Rakhaine'sinternational land border remains solelywith Bangladesh. Notwithstanding occasional Indian humanitarian assistance (surreptitiously aimedat courting the AA for KMTTP security), Bangladesh remains a Federal/ Independent Arakan's best choice for assistance and warm neighbourhood - a reality better understood at the earliest and acted upon accordingly with due prudence equally by the AA, the Rohingyas in Rakhaine and the FDMNs in Bangladesh.Conforming to the Sino-Indian customized "Parallel Communication Coordination (PCC)" concept of taking on board the Junta and the AA, Bangladesh may explore feasibility and potential for similar low profile communication and coordination with both.

In due course, the AA is poised toencounter anintricatereality where potential aggressive Chinese PMCactions, Indian KMTTP related accelerated activities and resolute US engagements, along with harsh domestic realities will necessitate assistance from a considerate neighbour like Bangladesh - where an honest AA reciprocity, specially, regarding accommodating the FDMN/ Rohingyas coupled with displayed assurances of not instigating Bangladesh'sdomestic trouble-mongers will ensure a congenial, stable and warm neighbourhood - an undeniable craving for any newborn entity. A graciously expectant sole international neighbour Bangladesh with 180 million people awaits a cordial Rakhine with 3 million people.

The writer is an International Relations (IR) Student at the Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP) and a multiple award winner of "Model United Nations (MUN)" competition sessions


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