Since the 1990s, European policy toward Iran has been based on the idea of engagement and the empowerment of the country's so-called moderate current. During the last two decades, the nuclear file became the raison d'etre of European policy toward Iran. The nuclear negotiations were critical in steering the relationship away from the potential risk of war to economic rapprochement after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Vienna in 2015. It was only after the beginning of the war in Ukraine last February and the failure of the new Iranian nuclear negotiations with the Biden administration that the European powers started to think about the Iranian question beyond the nuclear file.
EU sanctions targeting Russian and Iranian entities are a policy tool to contain Moscow, as well as to stop Iranian military support for Russia. Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, Iran has become the main military supporter of Russia, making it the target of a fourth round of European sanctions, while Brussels is planning to adopt a 10th sanctions package against Russia. The new European efforts are designed to stop the transfer of dual-use technology to both Iran and Russia. The idea is to prevent the two countries from producing military equipment to be deployed in Ukraine through importing sensitive components. This policy objective is to be closely coordinated with Washington and London. Also, the EU wants to convince countries around the world to apply economic sanctions, pointing to the risk of a military rise of Iran if nothing is done to counter Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.
European efforts will also have to focus on the enforcement of the existing sanctions on Iran and on finding ways to collaborate with regional governments. The aim is not only to publicize Iranian military support for Russia but also to work with regional countries that have been experiencing Iranian belligerency since the 1979 revolution.
But Iranian military activities in Ukraine should not be the only focus of European efforts. Indeed, Iran's support to its proxies and the proliferation of drone and missile technologies in the Middle East are continuing while the West's focus is limited to the Ukraine war. These continuing Iranian activities are also damaging for European interests in general and for European energy security in particular.
The European objective is to send a strong message to Iran after its delivery of hundreds of drones to the Russian military and their deployment in Ukraine. There is also the issue of the alleged deployment of Iranian military advisers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Crimea and Belarus to train Russian military forces in the use of Iranian military equipment. In light of this development, Brussels has no choice but to target Iranian entities, including some linked to the IRGC, which the EU believes are delivering drones to Russia.
Since last October, the EU has already announced three sanctions packages against Iran. This is more than during the previous nine years. The issue of drones and, potentially, the delivery of Iranian missiles to the Russian military is, for the European policy community, far more important than the repression of the Iranian protests that are dominating the media agenda in Europe.
Brussels is sending the following message to Tehran: The costs will continue to rise if the Iranian regime pursues a policy of military cooperation with Russia. The idea is to also outline the dimensions of the current Russia-Iran rapprochement and the risk of a Russian betrayal of its commitments to Iran. This was the idea behind the pursuit of nuclear negotiations with Iran after the beginning of the war in Ukraine and to reveal the Russian interests in Iranian strategic loneliness. On the whole, the main goal of European policy is now to reduce Iran's arms transfers to Russia.
To achieve this, Brussels is imposing a greater economic cost on Tehran to stop its military cooperation with Russia. The idea is also to target Iranian energy sales and to prevent the use of Iran by Russia to bypass US and European economic sanctions. This is especially true in the context of the Russian-Iranian project to build a land corridor to avert the economic sanctions. In addition, to up the pressure on Tehran, Brussels will try to demonstrate that it is breaching the JCPOA by providing Russia with armed drones. It is important to mention that new European sanctions on Iran should focus more on quality than quantity, while there must be efficient enforcement mechanisms not mere symbolic announcements.
The new sanctions will also target those responsible for Iran's military and political decisions, as well as those involved in propaganda and disinformation. The last main symbolic decision the EU could take is to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, as the UK is reportedly considering.
The economic burden of militarily supporting Russia is now part of the debate among the insiders of the Iranian establishment. The former head of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, explained that Europe is considering adding the IRGC to its terrorist list because of the delivery of drones to Russia. This Iranian fear includes the risk that it could be perceived as the main military ally of Russia and therefore a new front in the Ukraine war.
What could change in the coming months is the end of a lack of European consensus regarding adding the IRGC to the continent's terror list. This could happen if Iran delivers missiles to Russian military forces that could be used against Eastern European countries. In the end, the delivery of missiles could be the trigger that pushes Europe to take one step forward and designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization. Source: Arab News
