In Bangladesh's turbulent political landscape, newly appointed Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed recently declared that the days of mob culture are over. His pronouncement follows an interregnum marked by mob violence, during which the state's coercive monopoly weakened and streets often functioned as unlicensed tribunals.
Under the interim authority, collective violence exposed weaknesses in the law enforcement agencies, and the 18 months of Dr. Muhammad Yunus-led government effectively created a 'Kingdom of Mob.' The then Home Affairs Adviser Md Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, NCP Coordinator and former Information Adviser Nahid Islam, Youth Adviser Asif Mahmud Shajeeb Bhuiyan, and Press Secretary to the Chief Adviser Shafiqul Alam all appeared to legitimize mobs. They promoted the concept of 'mob justice' instead of acknowledging 'mob violence,' calling it 'public rage against long-term oppression.'
The Human Rights Culture Foundation reported 460 deaths from mob beatings in 2025. Ain O Salish Kendra recorded 128 lynching deaths in 2024, nearly double the previous year, including 57 in Dhaka, 19 in Rajshahi, 17 in Chittagong, 14 in Khulna, 7 in Barisal, 5 each in Rangpur and Mymensingh, and 4 in Sylhet. Killings based on rumor or suspicion rose, along with attacks on industrial and cultural sites, assaults on Baul communities, and even corpse burnings with religious slogans.
Institutional failures fueled the disorder. After the July mass uprising, police morale collapsed, creating an enforcement vacuum. Official rhetoric downplaying violent crowds emboldened actors driven by vendetta, factional rivalry, or ideological extremism, turning sporadic outbreaks into patterned coercion.
From August 2024 to February 2025, there were 225 attacks on police, including 70 major assaults. Forty-four officers were killed, including 15 at a single Sirajganj station. Over 450 stations were vandalized or looted. About 5,500 firearms and 650,000 rounds of ammunition were seized. Military recovery later added 2,259 weapons and 237,100 rounds of bullets, leaving a large arsenal unaccounted for and allegedly circulating among criminals. Evidence destruction hampered investigations and delayed prosecutions.
Among the brutal mob incidents, two men were beaten to death in Rangpur over alleged theft, and four people were lynched in Madaripur, one with an eye gouged out. A youth died in Tongi after being accused of stealing a phone. More than 50 students assaulted a vagrant at Dhaka University. Seventy-eight-year-old freedom fighter Abdul Hai Kanu was beaten, and former Chief Election Commissioner Nurul Huda suffered similar humiliation. In Bhola, a woman was killed after her hair was cut and a garland of shoes was placed on her body. In Mymensingh, a Hindu factory worker was beaten and burned over unverified religious allegations.
Political violence continued into 2026. In January, 75 incidents left 11 dead and 616 injured. The last ten days alone saw 49 incidents with 4 deaths and 414 injuries. In early February, 58 incidents caused 2 deaths and 489 injuries. Analysts interpret this as intensifying street coercion.
Targets were diverse. Minority homes and businesses faced 1,068 attacks across 49 districts from August 5 to 20, 2024. Shrines in Netrakona, Dinajpur, Rajbari, and Rajshahi were vandalized. A women's football match in Joypurhat was canceled. Cultural gatherings such as Mahati Sadhusang and the Lalon festival were halted. Leading newspapers and institutions including Prothom Alo, Daily Star, Udichi, and Chhayanaut faced attacks. Even the judiciary was affected when a magistrate reportedly allowed a self-styled mob into a courtroom.
Education was especially vulnerable. Demonstrations by 45 students reportedly influenced the fate of over 1.1 million higher secondary candidates. Teachers, headmasters, and university deans were humiliated, assaulted, or forced to resign. Education Minister Dr. A. N. M. Ehsanul Haque Milon, however, recently pledged zero tolerance.