Anti-Indian Politics of NCP and Post-Uprising Parties: Facts, Reasons and Process

Since the July-August 2024 uprising, one question has followed Bangladesh’s new political formations: Delhi or Dhaka? The slogan, however, is not a policy. The real task is to separate sentiment from strategy, and grievance from political instrument. The National Citizen Party (NCP), the youngest of the formations, formed under the patronage of the interim government led by Dr Yunus, following 2024 July-August Changeover, offers the clearest case. Its leaders insist that their stance reflects popular opinion rather than electoral arithmetic. Critics suspect the reverse. The record suggests elements of both.

The Pledge at the Outset
The NCP, formed by July movement leaders including Nahid Islam, Akhtar Hossain, Sarjis Alam and Hasnat Abdullah, has made opposition to what it calls Indian “hegemony” central to its politics. Launched on February 28, 2025, it initially stressed that Bangladesh’s foreign policy should be based solely on national interests, rejecting alignment with either India or Pakistan.

Its later political objectives, however, specifically identified “Indian hegemonism and Hindutva” as cultural and security threats, without making a similar pledge regarding Pakistan, the United States or other powers. The NCP subsequently joined the Jamaat-e-Islami-led opposition alliance, despite reservations among some July leaders, raising questions about its claim to a middle-oriented political course and whether its increasingly vocal anti-India rhetoric is ideological or strategically calculated.

NCP leaders reject the “hardline” label, arguing that they oppose hegemony, not India. Alauddin Mohammad, head of its international cell, advocates relations based on sovereign equality, while leader Faridul Haque has described Bangladesh-India ties as “not diplomacy, but rather a form of servitude” when they involve accepting Indian interests and hegemony.

Historical Root of Anti-Indian Politics
Anti-Indian politics long predates the NCP, growing from post-independence disputes over sovereignty, water, borders, trade and perceived Indian influence. The 1972 Indira-Mujib Friendship Treaty and May 1974 Land Boundary Agreement faced criticism from opponents, while Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani’s 1974-75 campaign and the May 1976 Farakka Long March turned water sharing into a lasting symbol of resistance to Indian policy.

After Bangladesh’s founder Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s assassination on August 15, 1975, distance from Delhi increasingly became associated with Bangladeshi nationalism, particularly under the BNP. Farakka, border killings, transit, the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, the 1997 CHT Accord and India’s perceived relations with the Awami League repeatedly revived the issue.

Pinaki Bhattacharya supplied the digital and populist dimension. His #BoycottIndia campaign began in 2018, long before the uprising, while his extensive social media activity later amplified anti-India and anti-Awami League narratives and supported the NCP-Jamaat alignment. In broad terms, Mazhar supplied ideological influence, Nazrul political and institutional proximity, and Bhattacharya digital amplification.

Facts, however, must be separated from political allegations. Hasina stays in India. Bangladesh has sought her extradition, while India has not handed her over. After the December 12, 2025 shooting of Inqilab Mancha spokesperson Sharif Osman Hadi, NCP leaders and allies publicly accused India of involvement before authorities established that any suspect had crossed the border. Mahfuz Alam subsequently alleged links between Indian agencies and political assassinations, while Sarjis Alam described the attack as an attempt to intimidate critics of Indian hegemony. These, however, remain as political allegations, not established investigative findings.

Likewise, NCP Convener Nahid Islam’s June 28, 2026 demand that India’s new High Commissioner apologise reflected the party’s position that New Delhi had supported the Awami League. His call for relations based on “dignity and equality” is a policy position, not evidence that India exercised the degree of control alleged.

Influenced by Malé and Kathmandu
Election outcomes elsewhere appear to have encouraged NCP leaders to view sovereignty-centred anti-India politics as electorally potent. Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s 2023 victory on an “India Out” platform became a prominent example, with Bangladeshi opposition figures calling for a similar movement.

Nepal offered another reference point. In the March 5, 2026 parliamentary election, the Rastriya Swatantra Party won a commanding majority, bringing its 35-year-old leader Balendra Shah to the premiership on March 27. These outcomes appear to have strengthened the NCP’s ambition to mobilise popular sentiment through sovereignty and anti-hegemony rhetoric, although Bangladesh’s far deeper economic and strategic dependence on India makes the comparison imperfect.

Intellectual Patrons
Three figures have influenced the NCP’s anti-India outlook: Farhad Mazhar, Asif Nazrul and Pinaki Bhattacharya.

Mazhar has arguably exercised the deepest intellectual influence. Many NCP leaders and July movement coordinators participated in study circles and intellectual discussions associated with him and were influenced by his ideas on popular sovereignty, anti-colonialism and structural reconstruction. His 2023 book Gono Ovutthan o Gathan became an important reference for young leaders who later formed the NCP, including Asif Mahmud and Mahfuj Alam. His writings on Bangladesh-India relations provided a vocabulary of dependency, unequal power and sovereignty.

Asif Nazrul had a more direct political relationship with July leaders, particularly Nahid Islam, Asif Mahmud and Mahfuj Alam, during the uprising and interim government. His interventions on Indian pressure and Bangladesh’s sovereignty reinforced emerging themes.

Pinaki Bhattacharya supplied the digital and populist dimension. His #BoycottIndia campaign began in 2018, long before the uprising, while his extensive social media activity later amplified anti-India and anti-Awami League narratives and supported the NCP-Jamaat alignment. In broad terms, Mazhar supplied ideological influence, Nazrul political and institutional proximity, and Bhattacharya digital amplification.

The Strategy to Keep BNP under Pressure
The NCP-Jamaat alliance appears to be using the India question to pressure the BNP-led government as Dhaka and New Delhi move towards normalising bilateral relations. The reopening of Indian visa offices, resumption of visa services, cessation of the push-in process and revival of stalled Indian projects have signalled a diplomatic thaw.

The opposition has responded by portraying rapprochement as submission. On June 28, NCP Convener Nahid Islam demanded that India’s new High Commissioner begin with an apology. On August 8, after visiting the July Museum, he questioned whether the BNP had removed photographs of Felani Khatun, border killings and anti-Modi protests “out of fear of India”. He argued that relations must rest on dignity, sovereignty and equality.

The strategy allows the NCP-Jamaat bloc to turn every diplomatic opening with New Delhi into a political test for the BNP. If the government improves ties, the opposition can accuse it of appeasement; if it adopts a harder line, it risks damaging an important bilateral relationship.

There may also be an electoral calculation. Dhaka University political scientist Dr Rashed Alam Bhuiyan has argued that if the July uprising loses political relevance and the Awami League regains ground, anti-Indian sentiment could consolidate around Jamaat and the NCP, potentially squeezing the BNP between them. This remains an analytical scenario, not evidence of a secret agreement.

The NCP itself insists that it does not seek hostility with India. Chief Coordinator Nasiruddin Patwary has called for equality and mutual respect, rejecting an “Akhanda Bharat” vision. Yet the political effect of its rhetoric is clear: by portraying rapprochement with India as a threat to sovereignty, the alliance can challenge the BNP’s nationalist credentials and compete for the political space created after the fall of the Awami League.

The Critics’ Charge and Political Game Theory
The NCP and like-minded parties have turned longstanding grievances over border killings, water, “push-ins”, trade, transit and energy into a broader charge of Indian hegemony. Nahid Islam has been among the most forceful voices. On January 30, 2026, he declared, “We are speaking out against imperialism; it is our slogan.” On February 5, at an election rally, he asserted that “Delhi’s hegemony will no more work in Bangladesh”.

The rhetoric sharpened on June 28, when Nahid demanded that India’s new High Commissioner begin his tenure with an apology over India’s alleged role in keeping the Awami League in power and sheltering people accused of involvement in the July uprising. 

By repeatedly invoking border killings, Felani Khatun, “push-ins” and alleged Indian support for the former Awami League government, the NCP assembles separate and complex bilateral disputes into one emotionally powerful narrative. It is less the discovery of a new grievance than the political repackaging of an old inventory of grievances in the post-Hasina, post-uprising mood.

Supporters argue that the position reflects genuine public resentment over border killings, water disputes, political interference and India’s perceived support for the Awami League. Joint Member Secretary Faridul Haque insists the party is voicing “the people of Bangladesh”, while Alauddin Mohammad rejects claims that the NCP is acting as a proxy for Pakistan or China.

Critics, however, view the rhetoric as a strategy that converts complex bilateral disputes into a single narrative of “Indian hegemony”. Writer Mohiuddin Mohammad calls that hegemony an invented adversary used to mobilise fear and support, noting that India has maintained relations with the Awami League, BNP and Jamaat at different times. Others warn that an increasingly aggressive anti-India campaign could strengthen India’s Hindu nationalist politics by feeding narratives about Bangladesh.

The central question, therefore, is not simply Delhi or Dhaka. It is whether the NCP is articulating genuine public grievance or turning a deep reservoir of historical resentment into an instrument for consolidating its political constituency.