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Chattogram Hill Tracts: Focusing Through a Realistic Lens

Published : Thursday, 19 November, 2026 at 12:00 AM
Lt Col Mehedi Hasan Sarker, SBP, psc
Apart from its recent rise as a tourist destination, the Chattogram Hill Tracts (CHT) has never been a familiar territory to most Bangladeshis. News from the region rarely reaches the mainstream. General understanding of its history and dynamics remains shallow, even among policymakers and academia. This knowledge gap has made CHT a fertile ground for misinformation, which often steers ordinary citizens toward misleading conclusions. As there are a lot of debates on Indigenous issue in the recent times, it is worth examining the CHT issue through a more realistic lens.

A Problem Older Than Bangladesh
Complexity in the CHT predates Bangladesh itself. Similar to other border regulations in the subcontinent, the British implemented the Chattogram Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900 to control the region’s isolation and tribal traditions. After partition, CHT became part of Pakistan. Owing in part to animosity toward tribal people that had sided with India in 1947, the Pakistani government disregarded the area. Then, in 1962, the Kaptai Dam flooded large areas of land, forcing thousands of people to relocate with little compensation. This deepened local grievances. Bangladesh inherited this unresolved instability upon independence. In 1972, tribal leader MN Larma sought autonomy for the CHT. The founding government declined the proposition, citing national sovereignty.

Nearly a million Rohingya refugees remain in Cox's Bazar, and post-coup turmoil inside Myanmar has created a hinterland of insurgents across the border. Together, these factors raise real risks of spillover that vested actors, both internal and external, could exploit. Undoubtedly, CHT’s stability is inseparable from Bangladesh’s national security and a much bigger concern than only indigenous debate.

Who Benefits from the Conflict
In 1972, the Parbatya Chattogram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) launched an armed struggle for autonomy through its armed wing ‘Shantibahini’. This caused two decades of suffering for ordinary hill residents who had no stake in the insurgency. The 1997 Peace Accord ended the conflict, but splinter groups emerged almost immediately. The United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) broke away first, followed by other factions such as UPDF (Democratic) and JSS (Reformist). More recently, the Kuki Chin National Army (KNA) has engaged in armed struggle inBandarban, disrupting both livelihoods and tourism.

These groups all characterize their conflict as a struggle for self-determination and autonomy. However, they expend just as much energy battling the state as they do battling one another. Genuine autonomy is impractical given the size of Bangladesh, and the idea of a “Jummo-land” has little real traction among ordinary tribal people. What actually sustains these groups is money. They rely on extortion, illegal taxation, and crimes committed with near impunity in a region where administrative oversight is thin. A fruit vendor may pay around Tk 3,000 per vehicle and households face recurring levies. None of this money builds roads, schools, or clinics. It simply fills the coffers of armed factions.

Why the Army Became the Predominant Actor
The Bangladesh Army was deployed in 1976 to counter Shantibahini, and it has remained central to CHT ever since. Even after the 1997 accord, when its constitutional role was meant to shrink for supporting civil administration and tribal councils, little changed on the ground. Civil administration and police presence in the remote terrain stayed weak, leaving a vacuum that the Army continues to fill. It mediates tribal disputes, drives local development, and often remains the only institution most hill residents can approach. This is less a story of militarization by choice. It is a story of institutional absence, which has forced the Army into a role it was never meant to hold permanently.

The Indigenous Status Debate
Much of the current rhetoric turns on whether CHT’s tribal communities qualify as “indigenous.” ILO Convention 169 of 1989 is the main international instrument on this question, which is ratified by only 22 countries across the globe. The Bangladesh government has stopped short of adopting this framework, citing concerns over national cohesion and sovereignty. While the demandsfor indigenous recognition gained momentum following the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, some vested groups cherry picked the word and started using it as a bargaining chip. The 1997 accord already protects CHT’s distinct social and cultural fabric through the Hill District and Regional Councils. Conversely, formal indigenous status would limit the state’s authority over land, security, and policy in the hill districts. This is a governance question, not just a matter of cultural recognition.

A Political Problem, Not Just a Security Concern
The CHT issue is fundamentally political. Mistrust of official institutions has been deepened by decades of underfunding, poor connection, inadequate healthcare and education, and previous displacement; most notably from the Kaptai Dam Project. Although its organization structure is biased, the Regional and Hill District Councils were intended to provide tribes with a voice. Five of the twelve seats in the Regional Council go to the Chakma, three to the Marma, two to the Tripura, and one each to the Mro and Tongchongya. Six lesser tribes, the Bawm, Lusai, Pankho, Khumi, Khiyang, and Chak, are represented by a single seat. Smaller communities become resentful as a result of this imbalance, which also allows armed organizations to assert that they are the only ones who represent tribal interests.Instead of making CHT a top priority for governance, successive administrations have seen it as an incidental issue, leaving the field open to insurgents and informal power brokers.


A Strategic Frontier
CHT is not an isolated ethnic question. The regionis located at the southeastern edge of Chattogram division and lies next to the most popular tourist destination Cox's Bazar. Chattogram, the economic lifeline of the country, is linked to the rest of the country by a narrow corridor through Feni. The strategic stake of the area is much larger than it seems due to the region’s mineral wealth, demographic diversity, and porous borders with India and Myanmar. Nearly a million Rohingya refugees remain in Cox's Bazar, and post-coup turmoil inside Myanmar has created a hinterland of insurgents across the border. Together, these factors raise real risks of spillover that vested actors, both internal and external, could exploit. Undoubtedly, CHT’s stability is inseparable from Bangladesh’s national security and a much bigger concern than only indigenous debate.

Beyond the Peace Accord
Implementation failures, especially stalled land reform, are often cited as the accord’s biggest shortfall, and that criticism is fair. But full implementation alone will not resolve the underlying tensions. The cadastral survey needed for land reform is extremely difficult given overlapping ownership claims. The accord's institutional design was also shaped by PCJSS’s claim to represent all tribes, which has entrenched the dominanceof three communities, the Chakma, Marma, and Tripura, over the rest. The accord needs revision, not just enforcement.

CHT is a governance and sovereignty challenge, rather than isolated tribal grievance to be managed by security forces. A sustainable solution needs fairer representation for smaller tribes, an active civilian administration, and inclusive development that respects cultural identity. It also needs political leadership willing to own the issue, rather than leaving it to the short-term fixes. Bangladesh cannot afford to keep treating CHT as a distant periphery. It is a frontier whose stability directly underwrites the country's unity and security.

The writer is a Lieutenant Colonel at Bangladesh Army



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