Can Democracy Flourish without All-Inclusive Political System? 

Bangladesh’s democratic transition faces a defining question: Can political stability and accountability be secured while Awami League (AL) remains excluded from electoral competition? As demands for justice over past abuses by AL intensify, the challenge is to reconcile accountability, political representation and public confidence without compromising democratic legitimacy or citizens’ rights.

The question has acquired renewed significance following the February 2026 general election, the formation of under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman government and the continuation of restrictions on the AL. It concerns not merely one party’s fate but the foundations of democratic representation, political stability and the rule of law.

The AL’s exclusion cannot be understood without considering the events that ended its rule. The July-August 2024 uprising followed years of grievances over good governance, political repression and electoral credibility. The United Nations Human Rights Office subsequently estimated that as many as 1,400 people might have been killed between 1 July and 15 August 2024, with the vast majority reportedly shot by security forces during Awami regime.

Any credible democratic settlement must address the suffering of victims and their families. Investigations must be thorough, prosecutions evidence-based and judicial proceedings fair. Accountability for alleged crimes under the previous administration cannot be dismissed as a political inconvenience, while political normalisation must not become an excuse to leave grave allegations unresolved.

But accountability and political exclusion are not interchangeable. Establishing individual criminal responsibility differs from determining the political rights of an entire organisation and its supporters. The state must distinguish between proven individual wrongdoing, a party’s institutional responsibility and the rights of citizens who continue to identify with it. Otherwise, the pursuit of justice risks becoming entangled with the question of who may participate in democratic life.

The AL remains barred from formal political activities and was unable to contest the February 2026 election. Its registration was suspended in May 2025 under Dr Yunus-led unconstitutional interim government and Parliament subsequently maintained the restrictions through legislation. In September 2026, the High Court dismissed a petition challenging the ban on procedural grounds rather than determining its substantive validity. The restrictions’ legal and political implications therefore remain central to the democratic debate.

The government and supporters of the restrictions may argue that they are necessary to protect public order and prevent a return to political practices associated with repression. Such concerns deserve consideration while allegations of serious abuses remain under investigation or before the courts. Yet restrictions also require scrutiny of their legal basis, scope, duration and consequences. The crucial question is whether they remain proportionate to their stated purpose and subject to credible legal review.

Elections do more than determine who governs. They allow citizens to express preferences, reject political leadership and hold parties accountable. An election may remain competitive among eligible participants despite a party’s exclusion, but it cannot directly measure that party’s electoral strength or establish whether it has retained, lost or regained support among former voters.

Bangladesh’s democratic progress should be judged neither by the AL’s future alone nor by the strength of its opponents. It should be assessed by whether the state can reconcile justice for past abuses with credible political representation. Victims’ rights must not be sacrificed in the name of reconciliation, while political inclusion must not be dismissed simply because it raises difficult questions about a discredited former ruling party.

This distinction matters amid claims that the AL’s public acceptability is increasing despite the ban. Such a proposition warrants examination but cannot be treated as established fact without comparative evidence. An August 2026 report on a nationwide survey conducted by the International Republican Institute between 16 May and 24 June found that 22 per cent of respondents viewed the AL favourably, while 72 per cent held an unfavourable view. The survey covered 5,000 adults across all 64 districts, with a reported margin of error of plus or minus 1.7 percentage points for the full sample.

Nevertheless, public opinion is not static. It may change with memories of past abuses, perceptions of the current government, economic pressures, the conduct of political rivals and the availability of credible alternatives. Support may reflect approval of a party’s leadership or policies, dissatisfaction with its opponents, or resistance to exclusion itself. These possibilities require transparent, repeated surveys rather than conclusions drawn from rallies, online activity or partisan claims.

Responsibility for navigating this challenge rests with state institutions and political parties alike. The government must maintain public order without substituting security concerns for a clear legal framework. The judiciary must ensure independent adjudication and due process. The Election Commission (EC) must apply electoral rules consistently, while parties must demonstrate that they can compete without intimidation, violence or denial of others’ rights.

Local government elections provide another test of Bangladesh’s democratic direction. The EC has indicated that preparations are under way, although the timetable and administrative arrangements remain subjects of discussion. Local institutions are integral to democratic life because they shape public services, accountability and citizens’ influence over decisions affecting their communities. A transparent timetable, clear eligibility rules and credible participation arrangements would help reduce uncertainty.

The challenge is neither to restore the pre-August 2024 political status quo nor to assume that exclusion alone can secure a democratic future. The objective should be a political order in which abuses are investigated, those responsible are held accountable and citizens’ rights are protected under rules that do not depend on which party holds power.

Bangladesh’s democratic progress should be judged neither by the AL’s future alone nor by the strength of its opponents. It should be assessed by whether the state can reconcile justice for past abuses with credible political representation. Victims’ rights must not be sacrificed in the name of reconciliation, while political inclusion must not be dismissed simply because it raises difficult questions about a discredited former ruling party.

How far can democracy go with the AL kept out? The answer depends on the legal justification for the restrictions, the fairness of their application and the ability of Bangladesh’s institutions to preserve a credible path towards political participation. Democracy must protect citizens from political violence while safeguarding their right to peaceful political choice.

Ultimately, can a political system claim full representativeness while the AL remains excluded from electoral competition? The legacy of the 2024 uprising, allegations of grave human rights violations and demands for accountability cannot be separated from citizens’ right to political representation. Neither past electoral support nor present exclusion, however, settles the question of public legitimacy.