
Bangladesh needs better connections with its neighbours. Better ports and market access can create jobs and diversify exports. The proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBC) may help. But a project crossing a conflict zone amid major-power rivalry cannot be judged by its economic promise alone. Bangladesh should not accept it before its costs and benefits are known.
The proposal emerged during Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on 26 June 2026. China outlined a possible link from Kunming, in Yunnan province, through Myanmar to Kyaukphyu, followed by a sea connection to Bangladesh. But the route, Bangladeshi port, cargo volume and transport arrangements remain unsettled.
For China, the project fits a wider effort to secure access to the Indian Ocean. Beijing has invested in the deep-sea port and special economic zone at Kyaukphyu. Oil and gas pipelines from the Myanmar coast to Yunnan are in place, giving China an energy route that does not depend entirely on the Strait of Malacca. A link to Bangladesh could extend this network and strengthen trade as well as strategic access across the Bay of Bengal. These would bring China strategic gains.
Chinese maritime research vessels can collect oceanographic and seabed information with scientific and potential military value. Yuan Wang ships, by contrast, mainly track satellites, rockets and missile tests. Their functions differ, but regional governments watch China's maritime presence closely.
China’s military-civil fusion policy promotes civil-military cooperation in surveying, navigation and infrastructure. Article 7 of its 2017 National Intelligence Law requires organisations and citizens to support, assist and cooperate with national intelligence work in accordance with law. Due to this law, Chinese companies in Bangladesh may transfer local data to intelligence agencies. Therefore, any sensitive project with China needs clear rules on data access, ownership, audits and national oversight.
A corridor is useful only when it carries enough goods at a competitive cost. Bangladesh’s goods exports remain heavily concentrated in ready-made garments, which account for roughly four-fifths of merchandise exports. New routes could help if they bring investment, cheaper inputs and new markets. But no public evidence yet shows how much extra trade the corridor would generate, what it would cost Bangladesh or how benefits would be shared. A port connection serving mainly Chinese supply chains would not automatically strengthen Bangladeshi industry.
Myanmar presents the largest practical obstacle. Since the 2021 military coup, the country has been consumed by conflict. The Arakan Army controls most of Rakhine State, while the military retains some coastal positions, including around Kyaukphyu. Fighting has continued near strategic locations. Any transport route through this territory would need the consent of those who exercise control and reliable security arrangements. An agreement with Myanmar’s military government alone may not be enough. Until a durable political settlement emerges, the land connection will remain exposed to disruption.
India’s interests cannot be ignored. The proposed framework, as described, links China, Myanmar and Bangladesh without India. The Chinese ambassador has said other countries, including India, would be welcome to join. That is a useful opening, but New Delhi may still view a greater Chinese presence near its eastern approaches and the Bay of Bengal with concern. Bangladesh has every right to pursue Chinese investment. But it cannot afford sources of mistrust with its largest neighbour. The answer is transparency, regional and extra-regional consultation.

Japan’s Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt, or BIG-B, offers a complementary approach. Launched by Bangladesh and Japan in 2014, it seeks to develop industry along the Dhaka-Chattogram-Cox’s Bazar belt through better infrastructure, a stronger investment climate and improved connectivity. Japan’s development policy also recognises the value of links between Bangladesh and northeastern India. BIG-B is not a ready-made replacement for the proposed corridor. It is a model for widening Bangladesh’s economic choices and connecting infrastructure with productive investment.
Bangladesh should require a feasibility study, cost-benefit assessment and transparent financing before making commitments. It should set safeguards for ports, telecommunications and commercial data, and assess environmental and social costs. It should consult India, Japan and other extra-regional partners while engaging all relevant actors in Myanmar. Any agreement must protect the sovereignty of Bangladesh and allow it to be reviewed if security conditions change.
Connectivity can expand Bangladesh’s choices. Poorly planned connectivity can narrow them. The CMBC may offer economic value, but the case has not yet been made. Bangladesh should keep the door open, insist on evidence and set the terms. Its geography is an asset. Foreign policy should keep it so.
The writer is the Editor of geopolits.com