If I have true faith in democracy, can I prevent any individual or group from participating in democratic processes simply because I dislike them? Do democratic norms and values allow me to respect one popular mandate while condemning another in the same constituency? In this essay, I explore how democracy may be diluted by what I call 'sectarian prejudice.' I draw my examples from the changing fate of democracy in Bangladesh.
Democracy is not perfect. Nonetheless, it has been the most widely used system of government in the modern era. Its greatest appeal lies in placing people at the centre of power, authority, and legitimacy. In a democracy, those who rule do so because they are authorised by the people, and they are held accountable to them. It is the popular mandate-exercised through elections and other avenues-that ultimately matters. Such mandates are not always predictable. People may prefer the less, rather than the more, educated, intellectual, or 'capable' candidates when casting their ballots. Some political scientists described democracy as the rule of the ignorant. While such critiques may carry a degree of legitimacy, they do not invalidate democracy or the principles that underpin it.
Democracy makes multiple demands on people-the masses, the elite, civil society, and those seeking popular mandates. One such demand is that we respect people's judgments unconditionally, even when we disagree with them.
Democracy makes multiple demands on people-the masses, the elite, civil society, and those seeking popular mandates. One such demand is that we respect people's judgments unconditionally, even when we disagree with them
The current rulers of the United States, India, Israel, and several other nations may not, by any account, be the best friends of humanity. Yet their legitimacy is not in question, as they each won popular mandates. They faced no barriers in seeking those mandates and thus fulfilled their aspirations to hold the highest offices in their countries and pursue their political agendas.
Things, however, have unfolded differently in Bangladesh's democratic landscape.
For a long time, a section of the educated elite prescribed what was legitimate in politics and what was not. Religion, for example, was treated as a strange bedfellow of politics which was expected to remain the political field. Such pre emptive prescriptions are undemocratic, as they deny people their right to determine the nature of politics-whether religious or secular.
Sectarian prejudice took concrete form during Sheikh Hasina's hybrid democratic regime. Democracy was trivialised as elections were reduced to farcical exercises. Yet secular intellectuals expressed little concern about this erosion of democratic processes. Their argument was that, credible elections or not, there was no alternative to Hasina. As long as the nation achieved what they regarded as the 'best outcome,' there was no cause for alarm. The mantra of 'more development and less democracy' gained popularity through such reasoning.
Bangladesh has now been without Sheikh Hasina at the helm for almost two years. Although not everyone is satisfied with all happenings since her fall and flight, at no point have conditions been worse than during her rule. That, however, is a different story.
The 13th parliamentary election was held on 12 February 2026, following approximately eighteen months of governance by Muhammad Yunus's interim administration. The mandate of this caretaker government was to carry out institutional reforms and deliver a free and fair election. Despite numerous constraints and a lack of support from multiple quarters, it largely kept its promise.
The Awami League, which had governed for over fifteen years before Hasina's fall in August 2024, was not allowed to participate in the election. Most of its senior leaders, including Hasina herself, fled to neighbouring India, making participation practically impossible. Even had the party been permitted to contest, it is doubtful whether it could have fielded candidates untainted by human rights abuses or economic crimes committed during those fifteen years.
With the Awami League absent, the election outcome appeared predictable. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was widely expected to win due to its strong popular base, cultivated through the legacy of its founder, President Ziaur Rahman, and the enduring image of former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia.
However, Jamaat e Islami Bangladesh emerged as a key player in our political landscape. The country's largest Islamic political party became highly active following Hasina's departure. It had also played a significant role in bringing down her government. Although Jamaat rarely wins sympathy in mainstream public discourse, it made concerted efforts to rebrand itself, invest in image building, and present a forward looking electoral agenda. It also attempted to bridge longstanding divides with other religious groups that had historically opposed Jamaat politics.
Prior to the February 2026 national polls, student union elections were held in public universities. Jamaat's student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, won sweeping victories in these contests.
We see potential tensions between democracy and sectarian prejudices. True democracy demands that we respect popular mandates regardless of who wins or who loses. Such a democratic spirit prevails in neighbouring India. However, Bangladesh has yet to reach such democratic adulthood where sectarian attitudes are found to prevent democracy from reaching its full potential.
The writer is an Associate Professor at the University of Queensland, Australia
