BRICS at a Crossroads: Can It Become an Effective Global Economic Power?

As leaders of the expanded BRICS grouping prepare to gather in New Delhi on September 12-13, the organisation faces a question more consequential than anything does likely to appear in the summit declaration: Can BRICS turn its growing size into meaningful global power?

The question goes to the heart of what BRICS has become. The grouping has never been larger. Its economic weight has never been greater. And its claim to represent the Global South has never been stronger. But its internal differences have also never been more difficult to manage.

That is the paradox confronting the New Delhi summit. BRICS has solved the problem of becoming bigger. It has not yet solved the harder problem of becoming more effective.

BRICS does not need to replace the G7. It does not need to become a military alliance. It does not need a common foreign policy on every war and crisis. Its greatest contribution could be more fundamental: Helping create a global system in which developing countries have greater economic opportunities.

Over The time, that ambition expanded into calls for reform of global institutions, deeper South-South cooperation and a more representative international order. The creation of the New Development Bank in 2014 demonstrated that BRICS could move beyond rhetoric.

BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa-Egypt-Ethiopia-Iran-United Arab Emirates-Saudi Arabia-Indonesia) now brings together major economies and influential developing countries from several continents. Its collective economic and demographic weight gives it a significance that the original five-member grouping could not have possessed. But collective weight is not the same as collective power. Weight is what countries possess together. Power is what they can do together.

The enlarged BRICS contains countries with sharply different economic interests, foreign-policy traditions and strategic priorities. India and China are simultaneously partners within BRICS and competitors for influence in Asia. Russia sees the organisation through the prism of a changing geopolitical order and its confrontation with the West. Brazil has traditionally pursued a more autonomous diplomatic path. Gulf members maintain important relationships with both Western and Asian powers. Iran brings its own regional security priorities. These differences do not make BRICS irrelevant. They make its purpose more complicated.

When BRICS focused largely on development, finance and reform of international institutions, its members could often find common ground. The problem becomes considerably harder when the organisation is expected to take collective positions on wars and security crises. Recent disagreements have illustrated that problem. 

There is a growing tendency to describe BRICS as a counterweight to the United States and the Western-led international system. That interpretation captures part of the geopolitical reality. But it misses something essential. Most countries of the Global South do not want to choose permanently between competing power centres. They want strategic autonomy.

The Global South is not a geopolitical bloc. It is a diverse community of interests. BRICS will therefore be strongest if it seeks a more multipolar world without turning multipolarity into confrontation.

This is where India’s 2026 chairship assumes particular importance. New Delhi has emphasised resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability. If the organisation cannot agree on every geopolitical crisis, it can still cooperate where its members have substantial common interests. The New Development Bank remains BRICS' clearest institutional achievement because it addresses a fundamental need of developing economies: Access to infrastructure and development finance outside traditional channels.

The next stage should be to make that cooperation broader, faster and more accessible. For a developing country facing infrastructure gaps, climate vulnerability or high financing costs, the value of BRICS will not be measured by the strength of its geopolitical rhetoric

At the BRICS trade ministers’ meeting in August, members advanced work on the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2030, resilient and diversified global value chains, trade in services and improved access to trade finance for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
 A small manufacturer in Bangladesh, India, Brazil or Egypt is unlikely to care which geopolitical bloc issues the strongest declaration. It will care whether it can obtain affordable finance, reach new markets and participate in a resilient regional supply chain. That is where BRICS can turn economic weight into practical power.

Reducing excessive dependence on a single international currency may be a legitimate long-term objective for BRICS members. But the idea of a common BRICS currency is far more complicated. The economies within the grouping differ substantially in monetary policy, inflation, exchange-rate regimes, financial structures and capital markets. 

BRICS should resist the attraction of spectacular announcements that are difficult to implement.  India has placed innovation and digital cooperation prominently on its 2026 agenda, including AI, digital public infrastructure, scientific research and start-up ecosystems. This could become one of the most important areas of South-South cooperation.

The developing world does not merely need to consume technologies created elsewhere. It needs the ability to develop, adapt and govern them according to its own economic and social priorities.

Cooperation among BRICS members in AI, digital infrastructure, education, research and emerging technologies could help narrow some of the developmental gaps that separate the Global South from advanced economies. But here again, BRICS should avoid turning technology into another arena of strategic confrontation. The New Delhi summit should not be judged primarily by the length of its final declaration or the number of leaders. It should be judged by what happens afterwards.

Can BRICS expand development finance? Can it make trade among members easier? Can it improve access to finance for smaller businesses? Can it strengthen resilient supply chains? Can it develop meaningful cooperation in AI and digital technology? Can it maintain pressure for reform of global institutions? And, perhaps most importantly, can countries with different geopolitical interests continue to cooperate without demanding that they agree on everything? If BRICS can answer these questions positively, its significance will extend well beyond the organisation itself.

BRICS does not need to replace the G7. It does not need to become a military alliance. It does not need a common foreign policy on every war and crisis. Its greatest contribution could be more fundamental: Helping create a global system in which developing countries have greater economic opportunities.

The future of BRICS will not ultimately be determined by how many countries join it, how loudly it challenges the West or how frequently it speaks of a new world order. It will be determined by whether its members can make their collective strength useful to the people and economies they claim to represent.