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Buddhist Nationalism and making Rohingya Muslim “Other”

Published : Sunday, 31 March, 2019 at 12:00 AM  Count : 719
The great depression and the World War II mark the end of the colonial rule in Burma. In the independence struggle of Burma many ethnic communities including Muslim joined in the anti colonial coalition. After independence the Buddhist Bamar, who are the majority of the entire population, started to dominate the country with a dream to establish homogenous Burma. In relation with that dream, anti migrants and anti Muslim activities were warmed up after Ne Win coup in 1962. State has systematically reduced the status and rights of the ethnic and migrant communities of Burma. These communities are predominantly Muslim and Christens. On top of it, their contributions in the anti colonial struggle were erased from the history. They were presented as the 'other' and 'outsiders' by which they were left in the stubborn isolation (Coclanis, 2013).

However, anti Muslim activities were not uncommon in colonized Burma. Those activities had happened periodically in the Burmese history, but Buddhist, Muslim and Christen lived together there. Now question is, exactly what had happened that triggered the ethnic cleansing in an organized form in the post colonial Burma? To understand this question we need to dig deep on the issues in relation with the concept of nationalism, ethnicity resistance and violence.

Roots of segregation:
Bamar is the dominant ethnic community who want to unify Myanmar on the basis of singular ethno religious cultural identity by ignoring other ethnic minorities' expectation and existence. They took anti Muslim activities mostly anti Rohingya activities in recent time as a means to achieve that goal (Coclanis, 2013). This attitude put myanmar in the state of violence and the ethnic minorities were persecuted in the name of terrorital unity. The immediate outcome of the Barman dream of homogeneous Myanmar is Asia's largest publicized and potentially the most explosive refugee problem. And Myanmar's history of isolation is also a history of ethnicity based religious extremist nationalism. Its history of violence is compared with the history of Pol Pot's Kampuchea and Ceausescu's Romania. This crisis also could be compared with the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslim at the hands of Serbian nationalist.

The post colonial Myanmar was experiencing the rule of factionalized democratic government. General Ne Win, a nationalist hero, grabbed the power in 1962. Its capital, Yangon was the centre of the 1988 democratic movement. However, martial law continued until very recent time and all the Burmese hated the people of uniform. The anti military sentiment was evident of their repressive rule and forced implementation of the martial law. And to continue the military regime, army as a cohesive force used 'the ethnicity based' 'religiously inspired nationalism' to polish their image as a saviour. By doing this they hold their position in the power centre. (McGowan, 1993). Systematically discrimination and military offensives against ethnic minority propagate a notion that as an institution only the army can save unified Myanmar from the ethnic separation. They are always ready to sacrifice blood for this cause.

Propaganda of patriotism was a tool of army to safeguarding their power (McGowan, 1993). Therefore, the 2017 violence against the Rohingyas is not an isolated case, but a continuation of an ethnic segregation process and a project of grabbing state power by military and Bamar leadership. Thus, the state sponsored violence reminded us of George Orwell's description of the colonial Burma in his novel title with 'Burmese Days (1936)'. His points and prophetical depiction matches to the present situation with foreboding accuracy.

Making of Buddhist nationalism:
Nation and nationalism are modern ways of imagining state society, cultured in the form of unity and identity and thus a potential supporter of violence against its perceived enemy (Smith, 2012; Gellner, 2005). Imagination is one of the fundamental factors which is necessary for the setting up of a nation, (Anderson, 1991) but the imagination too has a particular abridgment when nation formed its own restricted boundary (Brennan, 1997). To envision a nation without any history cannot be dreamed of. Evidently we see that both imagination and history play an essential preamble to form a nation which is likewise manifest in the formation of Buddhist nationalism where Rohingya community was imagined as 'other' and 'foreigner' in a way that it was needed at the formation period of Buddhist nationalism in the pre-colonial period.

Nationalism is, in essence, a consciousness and an expression of belonging to a nation (Smith, 1998). Narratives of nationalism often operate to challenge colonialism in the period of colonial rule and it had emphasised on the concept for instance 'our' sovereignty and the future of 'our' nation which is very homogenous in nature (Smith, 2012). The framing of 'us and them' is also significant as a defence of political sovereignty and as an expression of the civic nationalism. And when nationalism reaches a frenetic level, it affects the framed 'others'.

Myanmar is a perfect case to understand how power generated behind the veil of nationalism in relation with the genealogy of Buddhist nationalism. It is also relevant to understand how nationalism ethnicity and religion are the three ingredients of state apparatus power exercise. Moreover, like any other nationalism, Burmese nationalism was established through a process of constructing 'us and other dichotomy' and Burmese political violence is not free from the support of historical and cultural imagined facts. The Barman and the Karen were the two first
groups to join in that process. They have constructed their imagined community. Karen was aided by the British administrator and American missionaries and Barman was labelling them as the enemy.

Barman Buddhist nationalism mythologies their past in the formation of 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991). Their nationalism was against the colonial order as well as against pro-British communities. They believed their continuous relation with the glorious past was interrupted by the British colonizers in association with the other ethnic minorities. But they had failed to understand that they were also building them as a model within the 'colonial powers club model' by leaving the idea of a pluralist society and thus embracing the idea of racial separation (Gravers, 1999). They thought the foreigners destroyed their unique culture. On top of it, they used fragmented history and cultural symbols to build their state foundation on the ethnic segregation forces. Their cultural symbols like the spire on the pagoda, the royal symbol of the peacock on the flag, pictures of Aung Sang symbolizes their ownership of Myanmar. The meaning of these cultural symbols is that we are the legitimate heirs to this power. And thus nationalism was constructed on such symbolic power. In this context, Kapferer (1988, 2011) is very relevant to understand the relation between nationalism, religion and violence. He had shown how nationalism takes over religion and develops the character of a fundamentalist religion itself. He used Sri Lanka and Australia as an example of that hypothesis. There nationalism worked as a dominant medium for political battles. Violence becomes inevitable when religion becomes the substantial element of nationalism and determines identity. Myanmar case is no different from this analysis.

All violent action in Myanmar was taken and justified on the definition of Barman foreigner dichotomy. This is a hegemonic concept in all political debate. For example in the 1990 parliamentary election the opposition own 80 percent seats. But the military arrested those opposition candidates elected on the imagined ground that they have contacts with the foreign subversive forces therefore they are threat to the national security. Among arrested the communists and Christian Karen were named. This is a technique of power as Foucault (1988) described. Colonialism imperialism and the humiliating loss of independence were the historical memories used by the regime against political dissent and ethnic minorities. Even Suu Kyi was called as traitor and compared with Maung Ba Than who in 1885 had helped British to conquer the independent kingdom of Burma (Gravers, 1999). The New Light of Myanmar, a government newspaper, played a major role in this propaganda project and the army was portrayed as the historical saviour and the sole upholder of nationalism.

Buddhist Barman dream of homogenous Myanmar:
In the process of post colonial state formation Barman administration put emphasis on the ethnic groups based on ethno- religious criteria. Because, British used the divide and rule tactic so perfectly that the majority Barman never trusted other ethnic groups and fear foreign intervention. Difference based on the ethnic and religious identity was deeply integrated into the society. Political action was taken based on the past stereotypes. This is very fundamental to understand the hegemonic struggle in Myanmar where narratives of ethno religious nationalism played an indispensable role.

During the World War II the ethnic conflict and the fear of foreign intervention had grown among the Barman. British wanted to control Burma anyhow, therefore they left no room for inclusion policy rather used divide and rule policy. At that time, British managed to get help from the majority of the Karen ethnicity as well as form the migrant communities. This was also the rising time of the Karen nationalism which was based on the ethnicity and religious identity. The rise of the Karen's ethno religious nationalism created anxiety among the Barman Buddhists and challenged their hegemony, but British continued their support for Karen State in the power struggle as a part of their divide and rule policy.

With ethnic wound, Burmese independence came without any inclusive solution of this struggle. British left Burma and there was no alternative in the period of post colonial state formation. Freedom did not lead to the liberation from the past rather make a path of paranoia where mistrust was common and violence was inevitable. Burma failed to develop an alternative model which could include ethno religious plurality. The Barman lead state categorised every ethnic minority as a potential rebel and act on it. However, around 2500 years ago Buddhism was preached by Siddhartha Gautama. World perceived it as synonymous as a concept of non violence and love. But in modern times, it is not free from the politics and sectarian chauvinism. Time magazine much discussed story the face of Buddhist Terror (July 1, 2013) is relevant with this argument. It writes that, it is a faith famous for its pacifism and tolerance. But in several of Asian Buddhists majority nations monks are inciting bigotry and violence mostly against Muslims. Burma is not isolated from those countries. The country became independent from the Great Britain on January 4, 1948 and military emerged as the ruling elite and it was ruled by the military leaders from 1962 to 2011. During the military regime there was widespread activism against the government to restore democracy. In those protests monks had played active role. This was not a new phenomenon. Monks were involved even in the anti colonial movement for independence.

However, in the history of independent Burma, religion was not only performing its religious duties, but also it was politicising itself. There was no clear line between the religion and politics. Mixing religion and politics was one of the major components of the Burmese anti colonial movement which also continued in the era of democratic movement after independence. Considering this phenomenon, once Aung San, father of Aung San Suu Kyi and the nationalist leader of the independence movement, said, "Monks must desist from taking an active part in the political life" (Gravers, 1999). Aung Sang was considered one of the co-founders of the communist party of Burma in 1939. He was murdered in July 1947and probably he was the only politician who understood the danger of advocating and making a homogeneous Burma. However, under Aung San, the Burman Independence Army (BIA) assisted Japanese army to expel the British from Burma with a hope of independence. And because of Aung San's strong opinion, the demands Buddhism to be made the state religion were rejected. Aung San did not stop there, but went ahead and defined a national identity which was a reply to the British policy of 'divide and rule'. He offered an idea to include the race, ethnicity and identity together with a dream of Burmese Union. He stressed on the special rights to the minorities and an inclusive attitude towards all ethnic groups in a united Burma. But, post-independence Barman leadership destroyed Aung San's idea of a union state of inclusive attitude and supported the concept of ethno-religious nationalism.

The 969 movement and aftermaths:
The emergence of the 969 movement was one of the important events in independent Myanmar while religion, ethnic nationalism, and military interest came together under the Buddhist nationalist leadership. This movement was supporting anti Muslim activities across Burma. The ideological basis of the 969 movement was led by Kyaw Lwin, a Burmese monk who was the intellectual godfather of this movement (Coclanis, 2013, p.26). However, understanding the political development of Myanmar is always difficult. To make sense of that development it is very important to understand the 969 movement. It's difficult to separate the 969 movement from its emerging context. It was a time while some sections of the Buddhist monk community were involved in the protest against the anti military regime. Army Generals of the country were hoping to split apart those anti regime protest with a hope to get some support from them at least from couple of them.

In August 8, 1988 there was an uprising against the military regime. General Saw Maung crushed the uprising. Just after the fall of the movement, government scheduled a general election in 1990 the first since 1962. During this time, regime started to promote Buddhist renewal movement. Buddhist religious fanatism was combined with the intense Burmese nationalism and formed the ideology of the 969 movement. This ideology leads to the ethnic chauvinism. The principle ethnic group of Myanmar the Bamar constitute two third of the country's population. They are mostly dominant in the low land of the Irrawaddy basin and majority of them are Buddhist. They are the soul supporter of this movement.

The 969 movement had promoted and is promoting the slogans that 'Burma is for Buddhist', particularly for the Bamar Buddhist while other ethnic groups were identified as the 'other'. Kyaw Lawin was the central figure of the movement. His writings were collected and distributed among the followers of the movement. 'How to Live as a Good Buddhist' is one of his most discussed books which was published in 1991 and 'The Best Buddhist' was published in 2001. Both of the books were distributed by a unit of the official from the ministry of religion. This is an example of how the State organs, knowledge power and religious influence of monks worked in collaboration to build the ground for the fundamentalist idea of nationalism.

Kyaw Lwin died in 2001. After his death Wirthau and other monks took up the intellectual leadership of the movement. Their thoughts were mostly based on Kyaw Lawin teachings and they started their propaganda with an aid from the State.

This time they were more aggressive and more explicitly anti Muslim. And the movement had received huge momentum in 2001 while the fundamentalist Islamist Taliban in Afghanistan destroyed Bamiyan Buddhas. Buddhist nationalist had capitalized that event and started anti Muslim riots. There were riots in Sittwe, capital of Rakhine State and in Taungoo in the Bogo region of the south central Burma in February 2001. This was one of the major events of the anti Muslim sentiment and more than 200 Muslim were killed and eleven mosques were destroyed (Coclanis, 2013). Monk Wirathu was one of the major figures of this anti Muslim riot and propaganda. In 2003 he was arrested for inciting anti Muslim riots in his hometown near Mandalay. He was sentenced to twenty five years of imprisonment. In 2011, he was released as a part of a broader amnesty. But he did not stop himself from inciting violence against Muslims. There was another surge of anti Muslim activities in the period from 2012 to summer 2013. During this time Wirathu was mediating Kyaw Lwin's idea in a salient manner. However, through those events, the 969 movement appeared all over the country. Since November 2012, thousands of Muslims were displaced and many were killed. Many fled to Bangladesh. And thus the 969 movement was and is deeply involved with the recent problem. (Coclanis, 2013, pp.28-29)
What's going on in Myanmar is no more sectarian conflict, but terrorism in its style. Even in the Rakhine State where a large number of Muslims are living, but the violence is in somewhat one sided (Coclanis, 2013, p.19). Buddhist Bamar controlled the government and regime is aiding this terrorism. In this state sponsored terrorism rumour is an instrument to trigger riot. There have been a number of rumours of Muslim man attempting to rape Buddhist women. Evidence suggest that these rumours are nothing more than fictions and useful for provocation of violence. And thus violence was rationalized by using rumours.

Identity of 'other' Muslim:
There are various Muslim communities living in Myanmar for example, like Panthays of Northern Myanmar and Mandaloy Muslim community. Mandaloy Muslim is known as the Chinese Muslim. Migration played an important role in the formation of Muslim community in Burma. For example, after Bengal came under the Muslim rule in the early thirteen century migration to Burma got a new momentum, specially in the far west. Burma annexed Rakhine in1784 and some Burmese origin Muslim came to settle in Rakhine. The British annexed Rakhine State following the first Anglo Burmese war (1824-26).

They encouraged Asian migration. During this time the Bengali Muslim came from the Chittagong area. However, throughout the colonial period the British rulers encouraged immigrants from South Asia. Those migrants came from Madras, Bengal and Ceylon. Majority of them were Muslim. They inhabited in the cities and joined to the labour force in the local economy. They mostly worked in agriculture, transport and construction sector. They also joined the British military and some worked in the then British Civil Service. Many of those immigrants settled in Arakan know as Rakhine State. In the modern history of Myanmar, Rakhine State has reminded as a central point of ethno religious conflicts. However, Buddhist Bamar considered the migration of colonial period as an act of destroying their culture and unity.

Muslim of Malay ancestry lived in the Southeast of Myanmar while Indian Muslims are living in the Rangoon. The largest section of the Muslim community is living in the Rakhine state of the western Burma. But, Bengal Muslim overwhelmed the other Muslim community living in the Rakhine State. Muslims of the Rakhine was called as Rohingya which came from the word 'Rohang'. In Rihingya language it means Rakhine. However, Bamar community of Myanmar believe and propagate that Rohingyas are not part of Burma's Muslim community but they are 'Chitagonian Bengalis'. Therefore, they have supported a spectrum against Muslims in Rakhine. These actions include discrimination, persecution by the military and expulsion. This was not only limited in propaganda, but also in the census. The 1983 census is a good example of that. This census was not a complete census. No population count was taken from those states which were under the insurgency at that time. This is the first time that, Muslim population were widely disappeared from the country's national records.

Heading towards nowhere but violence:
Suu Kyi who was kept under house arrest for 15 years is also proved less effective to save ethnic minorities. Thus a weakened civilian federal government is neither able to chain its military or its commander-in-chief, senior general Min Aung Hlaing. This attitude and state arrangements kept Rohingyas as stateless people. They were and are subjected to violence which is nothing but ethnic cleansing. The State Law and Restoration Council (SLORC) is one of the world's most brutal tyrannies and they always play a key role in violence to crush all 'destructive elements'. They have ruthlessly carried operation to smash ethnic insurgencies. Following those operation nearly a hundred thousand refugees from the other ethnic groups like the Shan, the Kachin, the Mon and the Karen have flooded into neighbouring China, India and Thailand. Many of the ethnic community members were deployed as slave labour for large scale public work project. At the same time, political liberalization of recent time had brought little changes for the ethnic minorities. And thus, Myanmar is far away from democracy to ensure rights of minorities.

The SLORC and army are the two major agents of violence. Nationalism is a tool to justify that violence. The SLORC has affiliated interest with violence. And they knew that if they failed to promote modern economic growth and stability army will not support them. The internal solidarity will be apart away. It will also lead to loss of support from the civil society and people. Therefore, nationalism is opium for the Barman common people used by the SLORC to hide their failure and to make people believe that they are working to keep the unity of the country. It is a rhetoric used by the elites and state apparatus. Thus nationalism is an instrumental discipline within the army and the SLORC controlled organization and motivation to carry on violent attack against constructed 'others'.

The SLORC promoted Buddhism and Buddhist culture. They have maintained a close relationship with monks. They were carrying project of mixing tradition and modernity under the strict control of army. On behalf of the SLORC, USDA is the proctor of the national correctness project and run violence against ethnic minorities. The SLORC formed the nationalist organization named as Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) in 1993. The USDA claimed to have managed membership of more than seven million members. Keeping the national unity intact, promotion of sovereignty along with national pride and emerging towards a prosperous modern nation are the major aims of this organization. Patriotism, duty and loyalty are the moral code of this group. Their activities were targeted towards the Muslim minorities which has a clear economic interest.

Economic interest and nationalism:
There were attacks against the South Asian migrants communities in 1926, 1930 and 1938 (Coclanis, 2013). But it was not clear whether these attacks were anything to do with the economic interest. However, probably those attacks were presented as an act of political opposition to the British colonizers and their confederates. Now question is, along with race and colour when did economic interest start to play an important role in the conflict?

The Bamar are of East Asian origin. They speak Sino Tibetan language. They are lighter skinned compare to the migrant communities. Based on this identification they termed others as 'Kala' or dark skinned foreigner and thus justified structural discrimination and violence against them. Violence against these constructed 'Kala' is a nationalist project and here race, religion and colour based identity are instrumentalized to categorise people (McGowan, 1993). This process of marginalization is also attached with a political history and economic interest. The SLORC, USDA and monk activist are leading this violence to server that interest. The actors of the 969 movement, military regime and a large section of the population support violence. Moreover, violence has been continuing under the 'democratic regime'. The Bamar community is taking advantages of the political openings which has started in 2011. They are redrawing the economic, demographic and political maps. Thus the drive against the Rohingya community is not separate from the drive against other ethnic minorities for example the Karen. There were problem between Karen and Barman. They both were up to two opposite demand. Karen wanted their own state by stressing on their own pure ethnic culture and civilization and Barman wanted united Burma by stressing on their number and identity.

Fight between the Karen minority and military began in 1948 and it was the most long lived. Perhaps the most bloody one also. The Karens are mostly Christen. As a minority group they have been targeted by the Burmese majority since they considered them as favoured ethnic group by the British. In 1991-92 there was deadly and punishing offense against the Karen rebels. Their headquarters Manerplaw was attacked. Thousand were massacred and many were forcibly relocated to strategic hamlets. There was indiscriminate killing in order to fulfil their goal of total annihilation of the 'terrorist'. Army established concentration camp and turned whole northern half of the Karen State into a free fire zone.

The 2017 attack against the Rohingya community is very similar with that attack. In the later half of 2016, Myanmar State started a major crackdown on the Rohingya Muslims with the help of Buddhist extremist. The crackdown was in response to attacks on border police camps by unidentified insurgents. This had led to wide-scale human rights violations at the hands of security forces. And as per a report produced by the UNHCR, over 647,000 refugees have fled to Bangladesh since 25 August 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). This time like the previous one, Burmese military legalized the expelling process of Rohingyas by tagging them illegal immigrants, and foreigner. In near past, the Operation Prosperous Country was also one of those expelling project against the Rohingya minorities. Now, Regime has specific aim of population forced transfer which will allow Barman and Rakhine Buddhists to take over the left over land of the Rohingyas. It will also allow military to strengthen their power in the Rakhine state and in its border area. This strong control of army will allow space to explore and accumulate Arakan's largely unexplored energy resources. And in this large political economic project military and Barman Buddhist minority used the slogan that Muslims are the threat to the country race and religion. Success of this process also allow military to exercise its power by diverting people's attention from the country's extreme poverty.

Unfortunately, international community have only criticised but did nothing. Powerful neighbours like India or China continued their support for Myanmar with an aim to accumulate resources waiting to be explored in the Rakhine State. For business and strategic interest humanitarian intervention was opposed by these stakeholders. The UN has also failed to protect the most vulnerable. And there is no hope to get a permanent solution of this crisis. This chapter has given an analysis that how the crisis has unfolded. And it is remained unexplored to see whether there will be enough political will in the region for adequate action to protect Rohingyas.

Bibliography
Anderson, B. R. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso.

Brennan, T. (1997). The national longing for form. London: Routledge.

Coclanis, P. A. (2013). Terror in Burma: Buddhist vc Muslim. World Affairs (Vol. 176, No. 4), 25-33.

Foucault, M. (1988). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. London: Harvester .

Gellner, E. (2005). Nations and nationalism. Blackwell.

Gravers, M. (1999). Nationalism as political paranoia in burma. Curzon Press.

Kapferer, B. (1988, 2011). Legends of people, myths of state: Violence, intolerance, and political culture in Sri Lanka and Australia. Berghahn Books.

McGowan, W. (1993). Burmese hell. World Policy Journal , 10 (2), 47-56.

Smith, A. D. (1998). Nationalism and modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism. London: Routledge.

Smith, A. (2012). Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity.

UNHCR. (2018, February). Retrieved February 1, 2017, from UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/rohingya-emergency.html
Asif Bin Ali is a member of the editorial team, The Daily Observer and lecturer (Sociology) at Eastern University, Dhaka. This article was first published in the book: Buddhist Nationalism, Rohingya Crisis And Contemporary Politics edited by Asif Bin Ali and Sabbir Ahmed




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