In contemporary Bangladesh, mob violence has evolved from episodic disorder into a systemic pathology challenging constitutional governance. Streets resemble tribunals, crowds act as judges, and rumor poses as evidence. When enforcement falters through fatigue or ambivalence, collective fury fills the vacuum and turns public space into arenas where legality dissolves and fear becomes civic currency.
To grasp this crisis, the phenomenon must be viewed conceptually and historically. Mob violence, also termed lynching, mobocracy, ochlocracy, jungle justice, or street justice, is not new. Its lineage runs from punishments linked to Colonel Charles Lynch in post Civil War America to medieval witch hunts and modern South Asian vigilantism against alleged blasphemers or suspects. Emile Durkheim's theory of anomie offers a useful lens. Where authority erodes faster than new norms emerge, a vacuum forms in which lawlessness spreads and irrationality replaces restraint. Bangladesh appears to be passing through such a phase.
Recent jurisprudence shows mob violence is controllable. A Sri Lankan court sentenced twelve people to death for lynching lawmaker Amarkeerthy Athukorala and his bodyguard during the May 2022 protests after a crowd of about five thousand attacked them in Nittambuwa. The verdict proves that even amid upheaval, a state can prosecute collective violence. It raises questions about Bangladesh's own enforcement resolve.
Since the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government on August 5, 2024, Bangladesh has entered an anomic phase marked by weakened authority and contested legitimacy. Under the interim administration led by Professor Muhammad Yunus, the country was often described as 'Mober Mulluk or Kingdom of Mob'. Human rights observers reported mob violence as a dominant trend in 2025, documenting 460 deaths from mob beatings that year.
During the one and a half year tenure of the interim government, political rhetoric contributed to normalization. Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) Executive Director Dr Iftekharuzzaman argued mob violence began within state structures. Then Home Affairs Adviser Md Jahangir Alam Chowdhury said that there was no such thing as mob violence, sparking debate. NCP coordinator Nahid Islam, while Information Adviser, described such incidents as public rage against long term deprivation, a view echoed by Shafiqul Alam, Press Secretary to the Chief Adviser. Post uprising politicians increasingly used the term 'mob justice' instead of 'mob violence' to legitimate the mob related crimes.
Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony deepens the analysis. States endure not only through force but also through consent that renders authority legitimate. When trust in institutions such as the presidency, judiciary, or electoral commission erodes, governance faces a war of position marked by gradual delegitimization. In Bangladesh, repeated street challenges to judicial processes have resembled attempts to deliver verdicts in public before trials begin. If processions become tribunals, constitutionalism itself is threatened.
Events since August 2024 reveal a disturbing pattern. About 123 shrines were destroyed, including those of Hazrat Shah Newaz Fakir in Maska Bazar, Rahim Shah Baba Bhandari in Dinajpur, and Nural Pagla in Rajbari. Even the body of Nural Pagla was exhumed from the grave and burned on the open street. Houses of Hezbut Tawheed members in Pirgachha were looted and burned. A Hindu garment worker in Bhaluka was burned alive over blasphemy allegations. Victims reportedly included SM Millat Hossain, two journalists in Satkhira, actor Siddique, former Chief Election Commissioner Nurul Huda, and freedom fighter Abdul Hai Kanu. Media and cultural institutions such as Prothom Alo, Daily Star, Udichi, and Chhayanaut were attacked.
Industrial zones were vandalised and more than five thousand firearms looted from police stations, later linked to robbery, extortion, and murder. Official data show about 5500 firearms and 650000 rounds of ammunition were looted from police and Special Security Force arsenals. Authorities recovered 2259 weapons, about 62.4 percent, and 237100 rounds, about 52 percent. In sixteen months more than 1243 industrial establishments were attacked, 48 suffered major arson or looting.
Educational institutions proved especially vulnerable. Teachers were humiliated, threatened, or forced to resign. Students besieged the Secretariat demanding auto pass decisions. The General Secretary of RAKSU demanded the resignation of six deans labeled pro Awami teachers and even drafted resignation letters for them.
Gendered violence is another dimension. Women in Bhola, Munshiganj, and Mymensingh were assaulted or killed. In Akkelpur a women's football match at Tilakpur High School ground was cancelled after threats. In Bhola a woman accused of theft had her hair cut, was forced to wear a shoelace, and was beaten to death. Houses and flats in Rajshahi and Gulshan were looted. Film producer Salim Khan and his son actor Shanto Khan were lynched. Children and adolescents have joined violence while livestreaming it, which psychologists see as evidence of moral desensitization.
Several catalysts intensify the crisis. Mosque loudspeaker announcements have mobilized crowds through religious sentiment. Social media accelerates rumour through manipulated images, recycled videos, and fabricated narratives. Without rapid official clarification misinformation hardens into action, creating a cycle where digital rumor triggers physical violence that fuels further online spread.
After the February 12 polls leaders of the new government including Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, Salahuddin Ahmed, and Zahir Uddin Swapan declared mob culture over. Yet incidents persist. A Barisal Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate allegedly formed a crowd inside court to threaten a judge, and a Consumer Affairs magistrate faced mob intimidation during a raid in the capital.
Legally Bangladesh possesses instruments. Articles 27, 31, and 35 subsection 3 of the Constitution guarantee equality, protection of life and liberty, and fair trial. Penal Code Sections 141 to 149 and 302 criminalize unlawful assembly and murder, while the Anti Terrorism Act 2009 penalizes destruction of state property. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms fair trial and presumption of innocence. Yet these provisions target conventional crimes and lack mechanisms suited to digitally mobilized mobs. Investigations stall, prosecutions falter, and agencies hesitate before mass gatherings.
However, existing legal mechanisms fails to control mob in Bangladesh. We urgently needs a specialized 'anti mob violence law'. It should define mob formation as a distinct offense, establish command responsibility, require digital evidence preservation, criminalize online incitement, and create fast track courts. Clear sentencing and victim compensation would strengthen deterrence and public confidence.
The nation stands at a constitutional crossroads. Romanticizing mobs risks sanctifying anarchy. Robust legislation would reaffirm that justice rests on evidence and law, not rumor or spectacle. Civic peace, institutional integrity, and human dignity demand decisive action now.
The writer is a journalist at The Daily Observer and a lawyer
