Before dawn breaks over the floodplains of Gaibandha. A thin mist drifts low across the paddy fields, clinging to each blade of young rice like breath that has not yet decided to leave. Rahman, in his mid 40, walks barefoot along the narrow earthen ridge that separates his plots.His feet sinks slightly into the cool, damp soil. The air carries the scent of river water and mud, mixed with the faint sharpness of fertiliser that once promised abundance. He stops at the edge of his land and looks out. The seedlings are there, but they do not glow the way they should in the early light. Their green feels dimmed, as though a shadow has settled into their veins. Rahman bends slowly, his fingers trembling as he touches the soil. It feels lighter than he remembers, less certain, as if something essential has been taken from it. Let us see why and how.
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel started military aggression against Iran. The aggression triggered consequences far beyond their so-called"intended targets". In response, Tehran acted by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, a 21-nautical-mile chokepoint through which about 30% of the world's seaborne urea trade passes. What Washington and Jerusalem appear to have overlooked is that this military aggression would not only affect Iran, but would also cut off a vital fertiliser supply for millions of farmers across the Global South. It is now placing countries such as Bangladesh on a path towards a food crisis whose human impact could exceed that of the immediate geopolitical confrontation.
Bangladesh needs around 6.5 million metric tons of fertiliser each year to support an agricultural system that feeds more than 170 million people. Urea alone makes up 2.7 million metric tons of this demand. However, domestic production has been severely constrained by persistent natural gas shortages. State-owned plants operated at less than half of their capacity in the last fiscal year, and facilities such as the Jamuna Fertiliser Company remained closed for 361 days. Consequently, Bangladesh imports over 75% of its fertiliser requirements. Until 28 February, a large share of these imports came from Gulf producers including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, whose exports depend on passage through the Strait of Hormuz. That route is now effectively cut off.
At present, Bangladesh holds strategic reserves of about 1.8 million metric tons, which are sufficient to support the Boro planting season ending in May. However, the Boro crop, which contributes 55% of total rice production, requires between 3.0 and 3.2 million metric tons of fertiliser. The greater risk will emerge during the Aman and winter seasons, when reserves are likely to be depleted and new imports, if they can be secured at all, will arrive at prices that smallholder farmers cannot afford.
This situation extends far beyond Bangladesh. The Strait of Hormuz serves as a critical artery for the global urea supply. Qatar alone has an export capacity of around 4.2 million metric tons each year. Saudi Arabia exports another 2 million metric tons through the strait. Iran, despite sanctions, has the potential to export 4 million metric tons, while the United Arab Emirates contributes a further 2 million metric tons. Taken together, this trade accounts for 30 to 35% of all seaborne urea.
When the wider disruption to Middle Eastern supply chains is considered, along with the spillover effects on Egypt's Red Sea routes, the total shock to global fertiliser markets exceeds 40% of seaborne supply. As the World Food Programme has observed, many of the poorest farmers in the world depend on these imports at the very start of their planting seasons. In the worst case, this could lead to reduced yields and crop failures in the next season. In the best case, rising input costs will be passed on to consumers, resulting in higher prices for bread, rice, and vegetables in cities ranging from Dhaka to Delhi to Dakar.
What makes this crisis especially troubling is that it could have been avoided. The United States and Israel decided to proceed with this military aggression despite being aware, or choosing to ignore, the vulnerability of global food systems. Their intelligence agencies are likely to have access to the same commodity flow data available to market analysts. They understood that closing the Strait of Hormuz would not affect Iran alone, but would also send shockwaves through the economies of countries with no direct dispute with Washington or Tel Aviv.Many of which are already under pressure from climate change, debt, and the lingering effects of earlier supply chain disruptions. Therefore, this is not a measured strategic calculation. This is a form of recklessness presented in the language of self defence.
When fertiliser becomes too expensive or difficult to obtain across South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, and Latin America at the same time, the outcome is a widespread disruption to global food supply. This situation is likely to push up inflation, increase the risk of social unrest, and widen the gap between grain exporting countries in the West and import dependent nations in the Global South. The United States and its allies, having contributed to this crisis, carry a moral responsibility to secure alternative supply routes, ease sanctions that restrict fertiliser trade, and support developing countries that are bearing the consequences of a conflict they did not initiate. However, there is little indication that such steps will be taken.
Bangladesh, for its part, must recognise the only lesson this crisis offers, which is that food security cannot depend on geopolitically unstable chokepoints. The situation calls for an immediate increase in strategic fertiliser reserves to three times their current level, a long delayed restoration of natural gas supply to domestic production plants, and a swift diversification of import sources towards Russia, China, and Canada through state level, multi year offtake agreements. It also requires a change in agricultural practices, with greater emphasis on climate smart crop varieties, micro irrigation, and the use of efficiency enhancing specialised fertilisers that reduce the overall volume of imported inputs.
These domestic steps, however necessary, do not remove the responsibility of those who triggered the crisis. The United States and Israel carried out their actions on 28 February 2026 not as a final option, but as a decision that placed the food security of others at risk. It is likely that history will judge this moment harshly, not only for the damage inflicted on Iran, but also for the hunger that is poised to spread across multiple regions. The central question now is whether the international community will allow such a pattern to continue, or whether it will take a firm stance that no country's foreign policy decisions should come at the cost of the basic needs of vulnerable populations.
Let us come back to Rahman. In the fading light of late dawn, the fields stretch out around him, vast and silent.Rahman realises that the land is waiting for fertiliser or water. It is also waiting for a certainty that no longer exists. Somewhere far beyond these fields, decisions were made that he will never see, but their consequences have already reached beneath his feet. He closes his eyes, and in that silence, the absence of the earth's voice feels heavier than any sound.
The writer is an Editor of Geopolits.com
