July Charter hangs in the balance 

Are there any harmful elements in the July National Order (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order, 2025 in relation to the country and its citizens, including sovereignty, foreign affairs, and the economy? If we divide stakeholders into three groups-the country, its citizens, and political parties- it becomes evident that any perceived disadvantage applies solely to political parties with malicious intent; no disadvantages exist for other stakeholders.

The proposed reforms would restrict the ability of political parties to retain power through unethical constitutional manipulation. For example, even with a two-thirds parliamentary majority, a ruling party would no longer be able to amend the constitution arbitrarily if the said Order is implemented, because major constitutional changes would require a public referendum (gonovote). Furthermore, any constitutional amendment would also require approval by a majority in the upper house. It would be difficult for the ruling party to pass such amendments in the upper house at will, as its members will be nominated under a pure PR system.

Other provisions include limiting an individual from serving as Prime Minister for more than ten years, ensuring judicial independence, preventing politically motivated presidential pardons, prohibiting elections under the influence of a ruling party, and mandating a caretaker government system etc. Altogether, the 48 proposals in the Order are designed to strengthen democratic governance and accountability.
These reforms are broadly beneficial overall. They also create conditions for fair political competition. For instance, if a neutral caretaker government system is implemented, parties like the Bangladesh Awami League could still return to power through a fair electoral process, provided they are legally permitted to participate. However, despite this possibility, many Awami League activists, including the party president, oppose the Order, likely due to their loss of power following the July uprising. They may strongly resist any outcomes associated with the uprising, even if those outcomes have positive aspects for their party, which may reflect an issue of political ego.

On the other hand, the BNP also appears to oppose the Order after coming to power, likely due to concerns about losing similar advantages in maintaining power, like the previous Sheikh Hasina-led government. While the BNP cites constitutional limitations as a reason for its position, questions arise about its consistency, as it has not always strictly adhered to constitutional provisions itself (such as Section 4A and Schedule 6, and participation in elections in violation of Section 123 of the Constitution etc).

The ongoing controversy raises concerns: is it an attempt to disregard the will of 61.64% of voters, or an effort to retain power in a manner similar to past practices? There are no evident harmful elements in the July Order for the country or its citizens, and citizens have expressed their support through the referendum.

It is reasonable to assume that many informed and aware voters supported the 'Yes' vote. Many of these voters also cast their votes in favor of the BNP because they supported the 'Yes' vote. Had the BNP opposed the Order before the election, those voters might not have supported the party, and the BNP may not have come to power, as many of its seats were won by narrow margins; such opposition could have significantly affected the BNP's electoral performance.

Before the election, BNP leadership endorsed the "Yes" vote, but after gaining power, they opposed the referendum process. This raises an important question: does this shift in position amount to political deception under Bangladeshi law?

Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the referendum lacks constitutional validity, it still represents a clear public mandate, as a majority- 61.64% of voters- expressed their desire to implement the Order. Given this mandate, there appears to be no substantial obstacle to implementation. With a two-thirds parliamentary majority, the ruling party could enact the Order through legislation or a constitutional amendment if the BNP considers the Order unconstitutional.

Therefore, the ongoing controversy raises concerns: is it an attempt to disregard the will of 61.64% of voters, or an effort to retain power in a manner similar to past practices? There are no evident harmful elements in the July Order for the country or its citizens, and citizens have expressed their support through the referendum. Its provisions can be implemented either through the referendum framework or by adopting individual reforms in Parliament.

It is unlikely that parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami or NCP would engage in large-scale protests in a way that could damage their relationship with the BNP. This is partly because the BNP holds full power to pass indemnity provisions related to July fighters. If Jamaat-e-Islami or NCP protest strongly against the BNP to implement the said Order, the BNP may choose not to pass the indemnity for July fighters. The BNP is gaining such an unethical advantage due to the weakness of Jamaat-e-Islami or NCP. However, if the BNP ultimately does not implement the Order, it risks disregarding the will of 61.64% of voters. Such a move would raise serious legal, ethical, and political consequences for the party in the future.