Corruption is one of the greatest problems in Bangladesh. It hinders economic growth, erodes public trust in government and institutions, and creates inequality, with vulnerable populations suffering most. Strong political will and effective measures must be put in place.
However, before that, we need to redefine "corruption" because existing definitions fail to capture it from socio-political, economic, and philosophical perspectives. In Bangladesh, this is necessary before making policy, like a good diagnosis before treatment by a physician. According to TIB, corruption is "abuse of power for personal benefits," including bribery, fraud, embezzlement, neglect of duty, and nepotism. However, this definition lacks essential elements needed to understand the term.
I define corruption as the perception of a particular society shaped by its culture, markets, institutions, religion, and levels of development. Corruption is not just individual greed; it often reflects social norms. It may appear as bribery, nepotism, tender manipulation, political patronage, or the use of public office to serve family, party, business, or personal networks. Thus, corruption is not merely a legal offense; it is also a social habit. When citizens believe that nothing moves without "speed money," corruption becomes a parallel system of governance.
To understand corruption, we can focus on the work of the famous scholars Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz. They argued that corruption has existed across civilizations, religions, regime types, and economic systems. Therefore, the question is not whether corruption exists, but why some societies control it better than others.
Corruption is economically costly. Researchers argue that a 2.4-point decline in the corruption index is associated with a four-percentage-point increase in per capita growth. They also note that less corruption can increase education spending. This is important for Bangladesh: corruption not only steals money; it also changes national priorities. Corrupt systems prefer sectors where rents are easier to extract, such as construction, procurement, energy contracts, land, licenses, and permissions. Education is more visible and less convenient for hidden extraction.
This explains why corruption weakens development even when GDP grows. A country may build bridges and highways, yet fail to build trust, classrooms, teachers, hospitals, courts, and honest local administration. Bangladesh has seen continuous economic growth since 1990, but poor people suffer most from corrupt service delivery. A wealthy citizen can pay extra to escape delay; a poor citizen loses savings, time, dignity, and sometimes justice.
Transparency International Bangladesh's CPI 2024 report, released in February 2025, placed Bangladesh at 23 out of 100 and ranked 151st among 180 countries. The latest CPI 2025 result shows a slight increase to 24, but Bangladesh still ranks among the lowest-scoring countries. These figures are a warning that corruption is limiting national capacity.
The first striking point that applies to Bangladesh is the "means-ends" argument. When society strongly values success but does not provide fair access to legitimate opportunities, people search for shortcuts. Bangladesh is a society of intense aspiration. Families want jobs, migration, education, contracts, land security, status, and political protection. But when access appears unequal, merit alone seems insufficient. Recommendation, influence, payment, and party identity become informal currencies. If the formal route is slow, uncertain, or biased, informal payment becomes normalized. The tragedy is that people publicly condemn corruption but privately engage in it because they fear being left behind.
The second striking point is particularism, especially what scholar Edward Banfield called "amoral familism." Corruption often grows where loyalty to family or close groups becomes stronger than loyalty to public rules. Bangladesh is a family-centered society with strengths such as sacrifice, care, support, and strong emotional bonds. But when family-first morality enters public office, it becomes dangerous. A public official who favors relatives, a politician who benefits loyal supporters, or a businessperson who wins contracts through networks is damaging the republic.
Our problem is not that we lack morality. Our problem is that morality is often too narrow. We protect family honor but neglect public honor, respect elders but not always institutions, and help relatives but ignore anonymous citizens. A modern public culture requires the same rules for everyone.
The third striking point is that democracy reduces corruption only when it includes civil liberties, free press, opposition, independent courts, and the rule of law. Elections alone are not enough. For Bangladesh, anti-corruption reform cannot be separated from institutional reform. If parliament is weak, courts are slow, media are pressured, transfers are politicized, and regulatory bodies lack independence, corruption will survive. During Hasina's last fifteen years of authoritarian rule, political institutions fully collapsed. Huntington argued that such dysfunction leads to turmoil and instability, which we have already seen.
The fourth striking point concerns markets. Scholars such as Lipset and Lenz suggest that economic freedom and open competition reduce corruption by limiting discretionary power. In Bangladesh, many opportunities for corruption arise from permission-based governance: licenses, clearances, customs, land mutation, procurement, bank loans, and regulatory approvals. Where officials have unchecked discretion, corruption grows. Digitalization helps only if it reduces discretion rather than computerizing the same old rent-seeking system.
I believe Bangladesh needs a two-level anti-corruption strategy. The first is institutional: transparent procurement, merit-based recruitment, independent audits, whistleblower protection, local accountability, judicial speed, open data, and depoliticized administration. The second is cultural: we must stop admiring unexplained wealth, treating public office as private property, and calling nepotism "responsibility." A bribe is not cleverness. Manipulating a tender is not a business skill. A public job sold through influence is theft from the qualified.
Bangladesh's future will not be secured only by infrastructure, exports, remittances, or technology. These are necessary, but insufficient. The deeper infrastructure of development is trust. If citizens believe rules are for the weak and connections are for the powerful, the state loses moral authority. Corruption then becomes not an exception but an expectation.
To reduce corruption, Bangladesh must build a culture where public duty is stronger than private favor, merit stronger than recommendation, and institutions stronger than personalities. This is possible only if we admit that corruption is not merely something "they" do. It is something society permits, excuses, and sometimes rewards. Reform must begin withthe law, but it must also enter society.
The writer is a Lecturer, Political Science, National University Bangladesh
