After losing power through a mass uprising, the Awami League now finds itself facing a strange political reality. The party is banned. Its top leadership is either on the run or convicted. Many leaders are in prison. As a result, it appears that the party will not be able to participate in the upcoming 13th National Parliamentary Election. Yet paradoxically, it is the Awami League-albeit in a different form-that remains at the center of political discussion. Not the party itself, but its voters have now become the most sought-after political asset.
Almost all active political parties in the country have publicly taken a position in favor of keeping the Awami League out of the election, holding it responsible for crimes against humanity and genocide. On this issue, political consensus appears nearly universal. However, the reality of practical politics tells a different story. Although the Awami League's activities are banned, rival parties-including the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Jatiya Party-have entered into a stiff competition to attract Awami League supporters. As a result, a strange duality has emerged in the electoral arena: everyone opposes the Awami League, yet everyone is desperate to win over its voters.
It is as if the tree is bad, but the fruit is delicious.
The history of Bangladesh's electoral system shows that numbers always matter in vote-based politics. Ideology, values, and moral positions often become secondary to political reality. The current scramble over Awami League voters is a reflection of that same reality.
The elections of 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008 are generally regarded as participatory and credible. In those four elections, the Awami League's share of the vote was 30.08 percent, 37.44 percent, 40.13 percent, and 48.04 percent respectively. In other words, its vote base increased steadily over time. The elections of 2014, 2018, and 2024, although held under Awami League governments, were highly controversial and widely questioned, making the actual vote count unclear.
Following the student-public mass uprising of August 5, 2024, and the subsequent fall of the Awami League, a major political shift occurred. The party's activities were banned. Party president Sheikh Hasina and other top leaders went into hiding or were imprisoned. Verdicts were delivered at the International Crimes Tribunal against Sheikh Hasina and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal for crimes against humanity. In the wake of these developments, it is difficult to say with certainty how much popular support the Awami League currently commands.
Nevertheless, Awami League votes could still become a determining factor in election outcomes. The silent support base that remains within local communities, the administration, professional groups, and minority communities cannot be ignored. These quiet voters have now become crucial in electoral calculations.
Political sources say that a silent, seat-by-seat competition is underway to attract Awami League votes. In some places, Awami League leaders are being absorbed into other parties. Elsewhere, assurances of protection from legal cases are being offered. In some cases, old rivalries are being set aside in the name of social reconciliation.
The BNP believes that a large portion of Awami League supporters are now disillusioned about the party's future. The BNP is trying to present itself as an alternative force to them. BNP leaders say that social reconciliation has already taken place at the grassroots level. While this process has been slower in urban areas, as the election approaches, people across party lines are returning to electoral politics.
On the other hand, Jamaat-e-Islami is moving forward with an even clearer strategy. It has announced that it will also provide shelter to Awami League supporters whom it once viewed as political adversaries. Some Jamaat leaders have openly stated that if Awami League members join Jamaat, the party will take responsibility for all their liabilities. While such statements are not unprecedented in politics, in the current context they raise profound questions.
Still, political analysts believe it is unlikely that all Awami League voters will act in unison. Bangladeshi voters often make decisions based not only on party identity but also on candidates, local relationships, and circumstances. Thus, even if one segment of Awami League supporters abstains, another segment may quietly cast their votes.
Another important factor is the long-standing perception that a large portion of minority communities vote for the Awami League. This time, both the BNP and Jamaat are desperate to break that equation. Both parties are nominating Hindu candidates as a strategy to attract minority votes.
For Jamaat, this represents a major shift. In the past, the party had little visible participation from people of other faiths. But after the mass uprising, minorities are being included in committees and nominated as candidates. This strategy is evident in constituencies such as Khulna, Kishoreganj, and Bagerhat.
The BNP is following a similar path. The party has nominated several minority leaders who were previously associated with Awami League politics. Although there is internal criticism, the BNP is taking this risk in light of electoral realities.
The Awami League is banned and politically weakened, but its voters remain an important reality. The competition over these voters may influence the outcome of the 13th National Parliamentary Election-especially in constituencies where the margin of victory is narrow.
This election is not merely a contest for power. It is also a test of the moral direction of Bangladesh's politics. Whether political parties choose the path of ideals and accountability, or opt for any compromise in the pursuit of power, remains to be seen.
The writer is a journalist and political analyst
