
This Boro season, the arithmetic facing a paddy farmer in Bangladesh was brutal. Growing a bigha of rice cost them somewhere between Tk11,000 and Tk12,800 more than they earned selling it. Meanwhile, the government’s own minimum support price sat at Tk28,800 per bigha �" a number that, on paper, should have protected them from exactly this outcome. It didn’t. Newspaper after newspaper this spring ran the same story from different districts: bumper harvest, collapsed farm-gate price, a support price that farmers never actually got to collect. This is not a one-season accident. It is what happens when a policy designed in the abstract meets a market that was never built to deliver on it.
At the centre of the problem sits a technical detail that sounds bureaucratic but is in fact the whole story: Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Food buys paddy under a single quality standard �" Fair Average Quality �" with no flexibility below it. Moisture above 14%? Rejected. Foreign matter above half a per cent? Rejected. There is no discount tier, no weight-cut, no path for a farmer with slightly damp or imperfectly cleaned grain to sell to the government at even a reduced price.
Compare that to the region. India accepts damaged grain up to 3% and deducts for moisture above 14%. Thailand uses tiered weight cuts and rejects grain only above 16% moisture. Indonesia’s BULOG buys to standard, while private traders absorb off-spec grain at calculated discounts. The imperfection gets priced, not refused. Bangladesh, by contrast, treats “meets spec” as a binary. Most smallholders lack mechanical dryers, so they cannot clear the bar. The government centre meant to guarantee a buyer becomes a shop that will not open its doors. Farmers then sell to mill agents at whatever price they offer, because the paddy must move before it rots and input debts must be paid.
Open government buying centres at the start of harvest, not weeks into it, so grain doesn’t rot in the delay. Put real moisture meters and real published prices in village markets, so a farmer knows what fair looks like before they sell, not after.
The natural fix, drawn from what India, Nepal, Thailand and Indonesia already do, is to let licensed traders and millers buy off-spec paddy at a standardised, published discount �" enough to cover the cost of drying and cleaning it up to standard, no more. That is a genuinely useful idea, and closer to how a functioning commodity market should work.
But it must be built with its eyes open. The research behind this reform found that 69% of stakeholders believe intermediaries already hold outsized power, while farmers receive about 72% of the final consumer price and traders take the rest for collection, transport and drying. Giving traders formal authority to apply deductions without independent oversight would not correct this imbalance; it would legitimise it. A “standardised” discount schedule is only as fair as the moisture meter and inspector behind it. Bangladesh needs procurement centres where testing happens transparently in front of farmers, not merely on paper.
There is a more uncomfortable fact beneath all this: the government buys only about 10% of the national paddy crop, while private mills handle the remaining 90%. Grading rules, moisture charts and price-alert apps cannot change much if private buyers still control the market without any obligation to pay the support price. Expanding direct government purchase of raw paddy�"not just polished rice from millers�"must be part of the reform conversation. So far, however, no concrete plan points in that direction.
Four things, in order of what farmers would feel first: open government buying centres at the start of harvest, not weeks into it, so grain doesn’t rot in the delay. Put real moisture meters and real published prices in village markets, so a farmer knows what fair looks like before they sell, not after. Regulate �" and audit �" the weight-cut discounts traders are allowed to apply, so “standardisation” doesn’t quietly become a new way to underpay. And grow the share of raw paddy the government buys directly, because a support price that only covers one bag in ten is a promise, not a policy.
None of this requires reinventing Bangladesh’s rice economy. Every element already exists somewhere in the region, tested and working. What’s missing is the will to fund the procurement centres, staff the inspectors, and hold the line on enforcement once the rules are written �" because a good rule that nobody checks is worth exactly as much to a farmer as no rule at all. With roughly 13 million households depending on this crop, and Boro acreage already is shrinking as growers quietly walk away from a losing bet that will have to arrive before the next harvest, not after it.
The writer is former Director General, Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI), and Independence Day Award Recipient-2026