Gazipur BRT: A costly ride to nowhere

Fourteen years, thousands of crores of taka and a corridor built to ease one of the country's busiest commuting routes have failed to deliver a single passenger service. Now, Bangladesh's first Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project, linking Gazipur with Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, is set to be scrapped, with key infrastructure to be dismantled and the road converted into a conventional six-lane highway.

The Cabinet approved the decision on October 18, following which the Road Transport and Highways Division issued instructions to begin implementation. The move has raised questions over accountability, planning failures and the fate of a mass-transit system intended to carry around 25,000 passengers a day.

Under the plan, BRT stations and lane dividers will be removed to make way for three traffic lanes in each direction. Two existing two-lane flyovers may also be widened, while Dhaka Bus Rapid Transit Company will be dissolved and its functions transferred to the Roads and Highways Department.

Transport experts and planners have questioned the decision to abandon the scheme despite substantial infrastructure already being in place.

Professor Md Khasru Mia of the Civil Engineering Department at Dhaka University of Engineering and Technology said operational and traffic-management problems should be resolved rather than used as reasons to scrap the project.

“If there are problems with the operating system, it should be changed. If there are complications in traffic management, effective plans should be adopted to resolve them,” he said.

The Bangladesh Institute of Planners (BIP) has also opposed the move. Its general secretary, Professor Mu. Mosleh Uddin Hasan, described scrapping the BRT infrastructure as the least desirable of four options considered. The organisation argued that the decision could favour private-car users and construction-sector interests, claims that have not been independently established.

Launched in 2012, the roughly 20-kilometre project was originally scheduled for completion in 2016, with services expected to begin in 2017. Its initial estimated cost of around Tk 2,040 crore rose to Tk 4,268.32 crore after three revisions. By December 2024, infrastructure work was reportedly 97 per cent complete, though overall physical progress stood at 77.48 per cent. The service never began.

A further proposal in 2025 to raise the cost to Tk 6,598 crore and extend the deadline to 2029 was not approved by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council. Officials were instead directed to examine alternatives and identify those responsible for design shortcomings.

Among the project's major flaws was a mismatch between station design and the buses commonly used in Bangladesh: stations were designed for buses with doors on the right, while most local buses have doors on the left. Delays in utility relocation, inadequate drainage and traffic-management problems further complicated construction. Responsibilities spread across several agencies added to coordination difficulties.

Fifteen station structures were built, but several remained incomplete. The prolonged construction disrupted commuters, and project information records seven deaths in accidents associated with the work.

A Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology expert team led by Professor Shamsul Haque identified systemic failures in planning, design, technical assessment and coordination. The team recommended abandoning the BRT scheme and using the existing infrastructure to improve the highway. Haque also called for alternative public transport, suggesting commuter trains between Gazipur and Kamalapur.

BIP has warned that dismantling stations, ramps and escalators and compensating contractors could cost more than Tk 1,000 crore, although the final amount remains uncertain.

Gazipur Heritage and Development, which campaigned for the service to be completed, has also opposed the decision and plans to submit a formal protest.

As the dismantling plan moves forward, the questions of who should be held accountable for the project's failures�"and how commuters will get a reliable alternative�"remain unresolved.