The Grain, Gunboats, and Russia Equation in the Bay of Bengal

In November 2023, three Russian navy ships docked at Chittagong port. The fleet included two destroyers, the Admiral Tributs and Admiral Panteleev, along with the fuel tanker Pechenga. This was the first time Russian warships had visited Bangladesh in fifty years.

While it looked like a brief logistical stop, the visit set up a framework for Russian ships to refuel, make repairs, and get technical support at Bangladeshi facilities. The move ties directly into basic necessities like grain and energy imports, regional security, and growing trade ties between non-aligned nations.

Dhaka has long tried to keep its options open between competing powers. Japan is helping build the deep-water terminal at Matarbari, Chinese money supports Payra port, and India uses Chittagong to move goods to its northeastern states. Adding Russia into that mix gives Bangladesh another partner, helping safeguard its food and fuel supply lines while preserving its room to manoeuvre.

Food security drives much of this strategy. Bangladesh buys over seven million tonnes of wheat abroad every year. In 2023, Russia supplied about 2.5 million tonnes, which filled the gap left by Indian export limits and conflict in the Black Sea. Russia and Belarus also control most of the global market for potash, a potassium fertiliser needed for Bangladeshi rice crops. Dhaka buys over 1.5 million tonnes of potash annually, mainly from these two countries. Any break in maritime supply routes, whether from sanctions, insurance blocks, or regional conflicts, could disrupt the country's food supply within a single harvest cycle. Allowing Russian ships to repair, refuel, and resupply in Bangladeshi ports will give grain and fertiliser transport a reliable shipping route that avoids Western-controlled shipping networks.

Energy needs play an equally large role. Bangladesh relies heavily on gas, and recent surges in LNG prices forced the government into expensive spot market purchases that broadened its deficit. Meanwhile, external debt to Chinese lenders tops $7 billion, leaving little fiscal flexibility. Regional conflict around the Strait of Hormuz creates constant risks for Qatari LNG shipments, which fuel Bangladesh's power grid. Under these conditions, Russia offered long-term oil and gas deals at discounted rates. Delivering these supplies using tankers serviced at Chittagong or Mongla will give Dhaka a practical fallback option. Servicing Russian energy ships would create local jobs, update port facilities, and position Bangladesh as a transport centre for energy across the Bay of Bengal.

Dhaka has long tried to keep its options open between competing powers. Japan is helping build the deep-water terminal at Matarbari, Chinese money supports Payra port, and India uses Chittagong to move goods to its northeastern states. Adding Russia into that mix gives Bangladesh another partner, helping safeguard its food and fuel supply lines while preserving its room to manoeuvre.

For the broader group of non-aligned and developing nations, including the BRICS-affiliated New Development Bank that Bangladesh joined, the agreement shows how countries can coordinate maritime logistics. Through maintenance and support deals, the Bangladesh Navy will gain access to Russian military hardware, such as air defence systems, electronic warfare suites, and anti-ship missiles refined in recent operations. This access will update Bangladesh’s fleet without relying on a single foreign patron, giving Dhaka firmer control over its coastal waters in a busy Indian Ocean. The same Russian support ships can also assist during natural disasters. When cyclones, floods, or oil spills hit the coast, these vessels provide emergency transport and relief supplies. This allows Bangladesh to manage severe crises without building expensive high-seas navy.
Critics may raise concerns about a potential Russian military base in the Bay of Bengal, but that characterisation would be inaccurate. The proposed deal will focus on commercial port access and technical support under government to government (G2G) instrument. Bangladeshi authorities will retain full sovereign control over all berths, repair yards, and logistics hubs. Local and Russian companies, under public-private partnership (PPP) model, will operate these facilities, bringing in revenue and training local workers in technical skills. Russian naval visits will happen only when needed, and these arrangements will remain flexible and reversible. French, Japanese, British, and American warships already make routine stops at Chittagong, so adding Russian vessels simply gives Bangladesh another maritime partner.

Historical ties also play a role here. In 1972, the Soviet Navy cleared mines from Chittagong Port after the liberation war, which allowed the new nation to restart international trade. Fifty years later, cooperation with Russia on maritime logistics should be built on that historical foundation. For Bangladesh, exploring this vessel support agreement helps secure reliable imports of grain, fertiliser, and fuel. It allows Dhaka to protect its supply lines and maintain relations with multiple global powers without picking a side. The agreement reflects a broader effort by developing nations to use their local infrastructure to safeguard their own economic interests.